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THE MANAGEMENT OF SPEECH:
DISCRETION AND RIGHTS
Discretion is pervasive in our legal system, and yet we scarcely
know what it is. Ronald Dworkin, for example, has compared
discretion to "the hole in the doughnut."' Dworkin's metaphor is
unsettling because it so precisely captures our instinctive sense of
discretion as dead analytic space.
Discretion most often appears to us as merely the negative reflec-
tion of the law. It subsists in the interstices of the law. "Where the
law ends," Kenneth Davis writes, "discretion begins." 2 It is as if
law and discretion were binary opposites, as if the presence of one
signaled the absence of the other. We can have law or discretion,
but not both. And this is because, as Herbert Packer put it, "The
basic trouble with discretion is simply that it is lawless, in the
literal sense of that term."3
The difficulty with this view is that it blinds us to the subtle and
various ways in which law and discretion are in fact related. Discre-
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tion is not simply the negative reflection of law, and if we persist
with such a vision, we truncate our understanding of important and
complicated occasions when law authorizes the exercise of discre-
tion. This is particularly true when litigants seek to curb the man-
agement of government institutions by the assertion of constitu-
tional rights. In such circumstances the demands of law and of
discretion are at their greatest, as is the necessity of accurately
comprehending the relationship of one to the other.
This was demonstrated in the 1983 Term in Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart,4 a case concerned with the constitutional rules governing
protective orders that prohibit the disclosure of information re-
ceived in civil discovery. On one side was the First Amendment
right to be free from restraints on speech. On the other was the
need for flexibility in the management of pretrial discovery. The
Supreme Court perceived the case as a choice between law, with its
attendant rules and rights, and discretion, with its attendant flexi-
bility and effectiveness. The Court opted for discretion.
The decision placed the Court at odds with a long line of prece-
dents holding that discretion in the suppression of First Amend-
ment rights is particularly suspect. The most striking aspect of the
Court's opinion is its refusal to address this tension, which suggests
that the Court lacked an underlying theory of the relationship be-
tveen First Amendment rights and government discretion. If law
and discretion are viewed as irreconcilable, such a theory is impos-
sible. But if law and discretion are instead seen as complementary,
one can develop what the Court in Rhinehart so clearly needed: a
theory of the management of speech.
I. PROLOGUE: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL DISCOVERY,
RESTRAINING ORDERS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Modern civil discovery was created by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure of 1938. In a "striking and imaginative departure
from tradition," the Rules divested pleadings of their previous
functions of "issue-formulation and fact-revelation," and assigned
4 104 S.Ct. 2199 (1984).
' Proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee's
Explanatory Statement concerning Amendments of the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487
(1970).
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these functions instead to a new pretrial "deposition-discovery pro-
cess." 6 This process was to be conducted in the first instance by the
litigants themselves,7 who were to be provided with powerful "in-
struments" of information acquisition.' It was to be supervised by
the trial judge, who was clothed "with full discretionary power to
stop the use of the discovery weapons for harassment or other
ulterior motives. "9
Included in this discretionary authority was the power to issue
protective orders prohibiting disclosure of information gained
through discovery.10 Such restraining orders1" had many uses.
They could prevent unnecessary disclosure of trade secrets or other
confidential information; they could reduce the incentive to abuse
discovery processes by seeking information for purposes unrelated
to the litigation. As the philosophy of the Rules grew nationally
predominant, 12 restraining orders became commonplace in both
state and federal courts.' 3
' Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947). See Pike & Willis, The New Federal
Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38 COLum. L. REv. 1179, 1436 (1938).
" "To the extent possible, discovery should take place through procedures instituted and
carried out by the parties without judicial intervention." Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, "Topic Disc.-3, The Extrajudicial Operation of Discovery: A Tentative Approach
toward Improvement" (Oct. 8, 1963), at 1. See Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the
Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, A.B.F.
RESEARCH J. 873, 881-82.
8 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 501.
9 Holtzoff, The Elimination of Surprise in Federal Practice, 7 VAND. L. REv. 576, 580 (1954).
The first circulated draft of the federal rules contained "practically no provisions for protec-
tion" against discovery abuse, but, after "a storm of protest arose all over the country,"
"novel" powers to supervise discovery were incorporated into Rule 30(b). Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Proceedings of the Institute at Washington, D.C. 138 (1938); id. at Cleve-
land, at 287; Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States and the District of Columbia (May 1936). Rule 30(b) was thought to give trial
courts "sufficient control" to protect the discovery process from misuse. Institute at Wash-
ington, at 99.
1o Authority to issue such protective orders is currently found in Rule 26(c).
In discovery systems modeled on the federal rules, the term "protective order" is
ordinarily used to refer to the various orders, authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c),'by which a
trial judge exercises control over the discovery process. Such orders can range from limiting
or curtailing discovery to placing specified terms and conditions on discovery. For the sake of
clarity, I shall use the term "restraining order" to refer to the specific kind of protective order
that prohibits litigants and their attorneys and agents from disclosing to third parties infor-
mation received in discovery.
12 LOUISELL, HAZARD, & TAIT, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 27 (5th ed. 1983).
13 See Marcus, Myth andReality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1983).
Judge Edward Becker recently observed that he was "unaware of any case in the past half-
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Under the Rules the power to issue restraining orders was cir-
cumscribed only by the vague legal requirement of "good cause,' 14
which freed trial judges from "hard and fast rules"' 5 and thus per-
mitted "complete control" over the discovery process through the
exercise of "enlightened discretion ... to decide what restrictions
may be necessary in a particular case." 16 Although restraining or-
ders were designed to suppress speech by litigants and their attor-
neys, they were not thought to pose any particular First Amend-
ment problem.17
This comfortable system of judicial management became suspect
in 1979, when the District of Columbia Circuit, speaking through
Judge David Bazelon, decided In re Halkin. 18 In a closely reasoned
opinion, Judge Bazelon argued that restraining orders pose "many
of the dangers of a prior restraint" and thus require "close scrutiny
of [their] impact on protected First Amendment expression."' 9 Hal-
kin transposed conventional First Amendment principles into the
dozen years of even a modicum of complexity where an umbrella protective order ... has not
been agreed to by the parties and approved by the court." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita,
529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1981). For examples of restraining orders issued in state
courts, see Curtis, Inc. v. District Court, 186 Colo. 226, 526 P.2d 1335 (1974); Professional
Microfilming, Inc. v. Houston, 661 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Wagner Iron Works
v. Wagner, 4 Wis. 2d 228, 90 N.W.2d 110, 117 (1958); Bee Chemical v. Service Coatings,
Inc., 116 Ill. App. 2d 217, 253 N.E.2d 512, 514 (1969). Restraining orders can vary widely
in their provisions. Compare Tavoulareas v. Prio, 93 F.R.D. 24, 33-35 (D.D.C. 1981), with
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. 2, § 2.50, at 357 (5th ed. 1982), reprinted in 1
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, pt. 2, at 354-59 (2d ed. 1982) (hereinafter cited as MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION), with In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in W. Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 18 Fed. R. Serv. 1251 (N.D. Cal. f974).
14 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Virtually every state permits restraining orders to be issued
upon a showing of "good cause."
's Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita, 529 F. Supp. at 891.
16 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2036 (1970).
In 1963, for example, the Second Circuit, speaking through Friendly, J., summarily
rejected a First Amendment challenge to a protective order enjoining litigants from "publish-
ing or disclosing to any third party" certain information acquired in discovery. International
Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403. See also Rodgers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 536 F.2d
1001, 1006 (3d Cir. 1976). Judge Friendly stated simply: "[W]e entertain no doubt as to the
constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to forbid the publicizing, in advance of
trial, of information obtained by one party from another by use of the court's processes." 325
F.2d at 407.
1S 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
'9 Id. at 186. The holding in Halkin was anticipated by a decision in the Southern District
of New York to the effect that a restraining order was a "prior restraint" and thus unconstitu-
tional. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Davis v.
Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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context of civil discovery, and concluded that the constitutionality
of a restraining order should rest on three requirements: "the harm
posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the re-
straining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there
must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest
which intrudes less directly on expression."2
Halkin provoked immediate and vigorous reaction.2' The impact
of the decision stemmed from its conclusion that restraining orders
could not be analyzed independent of the First Amendment. The
opinion was controversial because the "rigorous standard" it estab-
lished was thought to curtail the ability of trial judges "to regulate
abuses once the discovery process has started."22 Precisely at the
moment when a growing perception of a discovery "crisis" 23 was
provoking calls for greater "personal supervision and management
by the trial Judge,, 24 Halkin appeared to deny judges the flexibility
necessary for such management.25
The logic of Halkin, however, proved difficult to fault. One line
of attack was to redefine and diminish the First Amendment inter-
ests at issue. But there did not seem to be a convincing alternative
analysis of litigants' First Amendment interests, and widely vary-
ing and implausible approaches were advanced. The nature of First
2o 598 F.2d at 191.
21 For discussion of the case, see Marcus, note 13 supra; Note, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders
and the First Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1645 (1980); Note, The First Amendment Right to
Diseminate Discovery Materials: In Re Halkin, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1550 (1979); Comment,
Protective Orders Prohibiting Disemination of Discovery Information: The First Amendment and
Good Cause, 1980 DUKE LJ. 766; Recent Decision, 48 CIN. L. REv. 900 (1979); Note, First
Amendment Interests in Trade Secrets, Private Materials, and Confidential Information: The Use of
Protective Orders in Defamation Litigation, 69 IoWA L. REv. 1011 (1984); Note, Constitutional
Standards Governing Issuance of Protective Orders Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) When Freedom of
Speech Is Restrained-In Re Halkin 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979), 52 TE\P. L.Q. 1197 (1979).
22 Note, The First Amendment Right to Diseminate Discovery Materials, note 21 supra, at 1559.
23 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176-77 (1979); Amendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980) (Powell,J., dissenting). For a narrative of the develop-
ment of the discovery "crisis," see Nordenberg, The Supreme Court and Discovery Reform: The
Continuing Need for an Umpire, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 543 (1980).
24 Pollack, Discovey-Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219, 223 (1977). See Schwarzer,
Managing CivilLitigation: The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400 (1978); Rosenberg &
King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579;
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 1.10 ("Judicial Control of Complex Cases"), at 17-
19.
25 See Marcus, note 13 supra, at 23-27; Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471,
475-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). For a contrary view, see Brink v. DaLesio, 82 F.R.D. 664, 677 (D.
Md. 1979).
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Amendment interests was said to turn on whether discovered infor-
mation was admissible at trial;26 on whether information was dis-
covered from the government or from a private party;27 on whether
information discovered was "commercial" or "near the heart of the
information protected by the First Amendment."28 It was also said
that since discovery itself was a matter of grace which could be
terminated at the discretion of the trial judge, litigants had only
de minimis First Amendment rights in disseminating information
gained through discovery.2 9 Although the last approach was com-
patible with great judicial flexibility, it was not widely accepted
because of its ipparent resurrection of the "right-privilege" distinc-
tion putatively discarded by the Supreme Court.30
An alternative line of attack was to emphasize the importance of
the government's interests in maintaining discretionary control
over the discovery process. This approach, taken in tandem with
the first, led some courts to an amorphous "balancing test" in which
"the trial court's broad discretion to impose protective orders for
good cause" was preserved.3' It led one circuit to a "standard of
'good cause' that incorporated a 'heightened sensitivity' to the First
Amendment concerns at stake."32 Tests proliferated,33 and it soon
26 See In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1981).
27 See In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 99 F.R.D. 645, 649 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
25 See Magnavox Co. v. Mattell, Inc., No. 80-C-4124, slip op. (March 24, 1981, N.D.
Il1.).
29 See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 206-07 (Wilkey, J., dissenting); Note, The First Amend-
ment Right to Disseminate Discovery Materials, note 21 supra, at 1552-57.
30 See In re Halkin, 598 F.12d at 190; In re San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 114; Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita, 529 F. Supp. at 911; Recent Decision, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 486,
502-04 (1980). So great was the divergence of approaches, that a consensus emerged only for
the propositions that litigants' First Amendment rights did not terminate automatically with
the commencement of litigation; that such rights were not "waived" simply by choosing to
engage in discovery; and that attorneys retained First Amendment rights despite their posi-
tions as officers of the court. See Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. at 475-76.
Halkin's reasoning on these points was persuasive. See 598 F.2d at 186-90.
"' Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita, 529 F. Supp. at 911; Air Tec Associates, Inc. v.
Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cases, 63,560 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
32 In re San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 116.
" One commentator, for example, found guidance in the Court's decision in Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and proposed a "Pickering-type balancing test."
Comment, note 21 supra, at 791. Another, with some prescience, found Procunier v. Mar-
tinez, 4167 U.S. 396 (1974), controlling and offered a different balancing test. Note, Rule
[1984
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became apparent that the problem was the absence of an underly-
ing theoretical framework within which a convincing analysis could
be developed.
In the midst of this disarray the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in a case that exemplified the confusion, Rhinehart v. Seattle
Times Co.34 Rhinehart was an en banc decision of the Supreme Court
of Washington, holding that under state rules of civil procedure
trial judges had "broad discretion" to issue restraining orders. 35
The Washington Court had concluded that even if a restraining
order were assumed to constitute a "prior restraint of free ex-
pression" requiring a " 'heavy burden' of justification," discre-
tionary authority to issue such an order was nevertheless justified
by the "interest of the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery
processes. "36
II. SEATTLE TIMES CO. V. RHINEHART: THE REASONING AND
STRUCTURE OF THE COURT'S OPINION
Rhinehart was an eccentric case. It involved the Aquarian
Foundation, a "spiritualist Church" that believed in "the ability to
communicate with deceased persons through a medium. '37 The
26(c) Protective Orders and the First Amendment, note 21 supra. Several courts and commen-
tators approved the strict Halkin test. See, e.g., National Polymer Products, Inc. v. Borg-
Warner, 641 F.2d 418, 424-25 (6th Cir. 1981); Farnum v. G. D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d
384, 389-90 (Iowa 1983); Comment, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 424, 434-35 (1980); Comment,
21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 331, 354-55 (1979); Note, 56 CHI. KENT L. REV. 943 (1980); cf.
Kuiper v. District Court, 632 P.2d 694, 697-98 (Mont. 1981). Some commentators ad-
vocated a test stricter than Halkin. See Recent Decision, note 30 supra, at 506-08; Note,
Constitutional Standards Governing Issuance of Protective Orders, note 21 supra, at 1218. Two
decisions, both involving newspapers, appear to have adopted an absolute standard, striking
down restraining orders as prior restraints. Georgia Gazette Pub. Co. v. Ramsey, 248 Ga.
528, 284 S.E.2d 386, 387 (1981); Vara v. Gore Newspapers, 8 Med. L. Rptr. 2231 (Fla. Cir.
1982).
34 98 Wash. 2d 226, 654 P.2d 673 (1982).
" Id. at 677.
36 Id. at 690. This conclusion was almost certainly incorrect. If even in time of war the
federal government could not overcome the "heavy presumption" against prior restraints to
have enjoined the publication of stolen classified documents, New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971), then surely this presumption could not be overcome by the
trial judge's restraining order in Rhinebart, which had been issued without findings and in
response to only the most general claims of confidentiality.
17 The Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, No. 82-1721 (U.S. Sup. Ct.), Brief of Resp., at
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"primary mental and physical medium" of the Church was Rever-
end Rhinehart, who claimed to "transfer ... objects from one place
or time" to another38 and to "apport" precious stones from his
body. 9 Aggrieved by a series of skeptical articles published in the
Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, Rhinehart, the
Foundation, and several church members brought an action in
Washington Superior Court for libel and invasion of privacy.
40
Alleged injuries included declining donations and membership.41
Defendants in the suit sought discovery concerning the Founda-
tion's financial condition and the identity of its members.42 Plain-
tiffs resisted, claiming that as a small and unpopular religion they
were subject to persecution in the community at large, and hence
that forced disclosure of the requested information would infringe
their constitutional rights of association and religion.43 In the alter-
native, plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a restraining order pro-
hibiting dissemination of the requested information.' After receiv-
ing affidavits alleging that violent threats and incidents had been
caused by prior articles in the newspapers, the trial judge com-
pelled the discovery and issued the restraining order.4" The order
38 Ibid.
19 The Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, No. 82-1721 (U.S. Sup. Ct.), Joint Appendix
(hereinafter cited as J.A.), at 20a.
o Named as defendants were the Seattle Times Company, which published both the
Seattle Times and the Union-Bulletin, and several individual reporters associated with the
articles.
41 J.A. at Ila; 104 S.Ct. 2199, 2203 n.2 (1984).
42 The discovery provisions of the Washington rules, like those of most states, are modeled
after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Liberal discovery is permitted not only of directly
relevant information likely to be admissible at trial, but also of information "reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." See Wash. Super. Ct. Rule
26(b)(1); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d 758, 575 P.2d 716, 719 (1978).
11 At the time they made this claim, plaintiffs had already produced to defendants Rhine-
hart's tax returns, as well as a number of other financial documents. 104 S.Ct. at 2203.
4 The basis for plaintiffs' motion for a restraining order was Wash. Super. Ct. Rule 26(c),
which is virtually identical to its federal counterpart Rule 26(c).
41 Although the trial judge's opinion is rather ambiguous, it appears that he decided to
issue the restraining order because he concluded that it would constitute an "abuse of
discovery" to use the court's processes to acquire information that would "normally be kept
confidential" and then to publish that information in the news media. J.A. at 51a-54a. In
issuing the order, the judge did not refer to plaintiffs' affidavits, or to any other facts in the
record. He apparently believed that the only factual predicate necessary for the issuance of
the order was that the newspapers intended to publicize information that plaintiffs regarded
as confidential.
[1984
HeinOnline -- 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 176 1984
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPEECH: DISCRETION AND RIGHTS
was ambiguous as to its scope,46 and the judge made no effort to
support it by findings of fact.47
The order was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Washington in
an opinion which strongly argued that restraining orders were a
necessary concomitant of a system of liberal discovery. The court
noted that without the assurance provided by restraining orders,
information produced in discovery "will be used only for the legiti-
mate purposes of litigation," litigants concerned with publicity
might be tempted to "withhold information" or "to shade the
truth," or even to "forego the pursuit of their just claims. '48
Even the Halkin decision, however, had acknowledged that re-
straining orders were important for "the effective functioning of the
civil discovery system."'49 But the Washington court, unlike the
D.C. Circuit, believed that "the integrity of the discovery process"
could be protected only if trial judges were free to exercise "a broad
discretion to manage the discovery process in a fashion that will
implement the goal of full disclosure of relevant information and at
the same time afford the participants protection against harmful
side effects."' Thus while the Halkin court would permit the is-
" The relevant provisions of the restraining order state: "2. Plaintiffs' motion for a protec-
tive order is granted with respect to information gained by the defendants through the use of
all of the discovery processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the
names and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the
names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, or donors to any of
the various plaintiffs. 3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not
disseminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through discovery, other
than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering party to try the case. As a result,
information gained by a defendant through the discovery process may not be published by
any of the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dissemination.
This protective order has no application except to information gained by the defendants
through the use of discovery processes." 104 S.Ct. at 2204 n.8. The'restraining order is thus
ambiguous with respect to scope, because it is not clear whether it applies only to informa-
tion "regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs [and] the names and addresses of
[plaintiffs'] members, contributors or clients," as described in paragraph 2 of the order, or
whether it applies to all "information gained by a defendant through the discovery process,"
as described in paragraph 3 of the order. The Washington Supreme Court referred to the
order twice, once as if it applied to all information received in discovery, 654 P.2d at 675, and
once as if it applied only to the specific information described in paragraph 2. 654 P.2d at
690.
47 See note 45 supra.
48 654 P.2d at 689. Apart from the instrumental effects of restraining orders on the system
of pretrial discovery, the court also noted that they served to implement the state's interest in
protecting "citizens in their legitimate expectations of privacy." Id. at 688. See id. at 679-80.
49 598 F.2d at 192.
s" 654 P.2d at 689, 677.
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suance of a restraining order only if a trial judge considered and
made "the necessary findings on each element" of the appropriate
First Amendment standard,51 the Washington Supreme Court
found these restrictions "unduly complex and onerous" to achieve
"the objectives of pretrial discovery." 2 It disparaged "the difficul-
ties which... trial courts create for themselves when they attempt
to enunciate restrictive criteria for the exercise of their discre-
tion."53 The Washington court concluded that the management of
pretrial discovery could constitutionally be accorded the flexibility
necessary to attain its ends. The issuance of restraining orders was
to be "singularly within the discretion of the trial court" and revers-
ible "only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion."5 4
-As the case came to the Supreme Court of the United States,
therefore, it was susceptible to several narrow resolutions. The
Court could have found the restraining order before it justified
because of plaintiffs' constitutional interests in freedom of associa-
tion and religion, or because the affidavits in the record graphically
detailed dangers of actual physical harm. Conversely, the Court
could have found the restraining order constitutionally unjustified
because of its ambiguity, or because it was not grounded in findings
of fact."5 But the Court avoided these narrow approaches and in-
stead affirmed the Washington court on the broadest possible
grounds.
In a terse and unanimous opinion, the Court, speaking through
Justice Powell, held that although litigants had First Amendment
rights in the dissemination of information gained through discov-
ery, the State's "substantial interest in preventing ... abuse of its
"' 598 F.2d at 192.
52 654 P.2d at 685.
" Id. at 684.
54 Id. at 678.
" There is a developing case law interpreting the "good cause" requirement of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(c) to require "a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from
stereotyped and conclusory statements." WRIGHT & MILLER, note 16 supra, § 2035 at 265.
See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981); General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb
Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973); Zenith Radio Corp. v, Matsushita, 529
F. Supp. at 891; United States v. Hooker Chemical & Plastics Co., 90 F.R.D. 421, 425
(W.D.N.Y. 1981); Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980);
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. North American Co. for Property and Casualty Ins., slip op., No. 76
Civ. 802 (Dec. 9, 1980, S.D.N.Y.). These holdings, however, are not constitutional in
nature.
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processes" justified delegation of "broad discretion on the trial court
to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of
protection is required." There was to be "no heightened First
Amendment scrutiny.,
5 6
This conclusion was clearly designed to terminate the turmoil
created by Halkin. But the price of this achievement was to place
the Court at odds with a long line of precedents holding that the
First Amendment deeply disfavors "official discretionary power to
control" speech 7 in the absence of "narrowly drawn, reasonable
and definite standards for the officials to follow." Only six days
before Rhinehart, the Court had reaffirmed its commitment to the
rule that statutes creating discretionary authority to suppress
speech are facially unconstitutional, since "every application of the
statute create[s] an impermissible risk of the suppression of ideas."5 9
This tension between First Amendment rights and official dis-
cretion is never acknowledged in Justice Powell's opinion. The
silence is strange, and gives the impression that the issue was
avoided because the Court lacked a conceptual scheme within
which it could be analyzed. Instead the Court struggled to justify
its conclusion using conventional doctrinal formulations that were
inconsistent with the exercise of official discretion.
A. THE PROCUNIER TEST
At the outset of its opinion the Court announced, without fur-
ther explanation, that the constitutionality of Washington's Rule
26(c), which authorizes the issuance of restraining orders, 60 would
turn on
6 1
" Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 2209 (1984). AlthoughJustice Brennan
joined Justice Powell's opinion, he also wrote two brief concurring paragraphs in which he
said that he would affirm the judgment of the Washington court because plaintiffs' "interests
in privacy and religious freedom are sufficient to justify this protective order and to overcome
the protections afforded free expression by the First Amendment." 104 S.Ct. at 2210. Justice
Brennan's opinion was joined by Justice Marshall.
57 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951).
" Nietmotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951). See Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
mingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 & n.2 (1969); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
s9 Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2125 & n.15
(1984).
'0 See note 44 supra.
61 104 S.Ct. at 2207.
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whether the "practice in question [furthers] an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression," and whether "the limitation of First Amendment
freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular governmental interest involved."
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); see Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-55 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 25 (1976).
The two-part test derives from Procunier v. Martinez, an early Pow-
ell opinion dealing with the censorship of prisoners' mail. In fash-
ioning the Procunier test, Powell relied explicitly on Chief Justice
Warren's opinion in United States v. O'Brien.62
The first element of the test concerns whether Rule 26(c) furthers
a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression. The Court argued that Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial
government interest in the protection of the "privacy interests of
litigants and third parties."63 As a preliminary matter, this interest
does not appear to be "unrelated to the suppression of expression."
Every suppression of speech can be justified in terms of an interest
that is speech neutral. A ban on the teaching of anarchy, for ex-
ample, can be justified on the grounds of domestic security. There-
fore a sensible interpretation of the requirement that a government
interest be "unrelated to the suppression of expression" must ask, as
John Ely does in his discussion of O'Brien, "whether the harm that
the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact that the
defendant is communicating, and more particularly out of the way
people can be expected to react to his message, or rather would
arise even if the defendant's conduct had no communicative signifi-
cance whatever."6 4
In Rhinehart the Court stated that restraining orders were
justified because of the government's interest in the protection of
privacy interests. But this justification turns precisely on the fact
that litigants are communicating. The purpose of Rule 26(c) is to
62 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 411-14 (1974).
63 104 S.Ct. at 2208.
64 Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. RaV. 1482, 1497 (1975). See TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 580-88 (1978). This is the approach implicitly adopted by the Court in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 n.9 (1980).
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eliminate the consequences of speaking about certain kinds of sub-
jects; if litigants spoke gibberish, so that no one could understand
them, privacy interests would not be endangered. For this reason
the government's interest cannot be said to be unrelated to the
suppression of expression.65
More important, however, the Court was unable to employ the
Procunier test in an internally consistent manner. This is true for
two reasons. First, the Procunier test requires that the "practice in
question" further a "substantial" government interest. To justify
the issuance of a restraining order, therefore, the privacy interest to
be protected must be "substantial." At a minimum this required the
Court to create standards by which "substantial" privacy interests
could be identified and distinguished from "nonsubstantial" pri-
vacy interests. In previous cases the Court has been quite strict in
specifying the kinds of privacy interests that could justify suppres-
sion of speech. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, for example,
where the Court faced a similar "collision between claims of pri-
vacy and those of" freedom of speech, the Court recognized the
need for "caution" and carefully crafted a narrow decision stressing
the exact nature of the privacy interest sought to be protected by
state law.66 But the Court made no such effort in Rhinehart. It
refused to identify which privacy interests were "substantial" and
hence would constitutionally justify the issuance of a restraining
order. For this reason the Court could not claim that Rule 26(c)
authorized only those restraining orders necessary to protect "sub-
stantial" privacy interests.67 Consequently, its conclusion that Rule
26(c) satisfied the first element of the Procunier test is simply unsus-
tainable.
Second, the Procunier test required that "the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms" be "no greater than is necessary or essential
to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved."
But if the Court has not specified the nature of the privacy interests
' Powell's handling of this question recalls his treatment of the same issue in Procunier.
See 416 U.S. at 413. In that case the regulation at issue sought to suppress the results of
intended communications, and yet Powell viewed it as "speech neutral," thus eviscerating
the requirement that the regulation be "unrelated to the suppression of expression."
6 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
67 The requirement that restraining orders only issue to protect substantial privacy inter-
ests is not implicit in the "good cause" standard of Rule 26(c), because that standard simply
confers discretion on trial courts. See text at notes 14-16 supra.
HeinOnline -- 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 181 1984
182 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
to be protected, then it would seem in principle impossible to know
whether limitations on First Amendment freedoms will be "neces-
sary or essential." The Court's conclusion, moreover, was that it is
constitutional to commit the issuance of restraining orders to the
broad discretion of trial judges. The Court did not restrict that
discretion by requiring trial judges to consider litigants' First
Amendment interests. Thus where litigants' First Amendment in-
terests can be accommodated without impairment of government
interests, as, for example, where a narrower or more precise re-
straining order would adequately protect pertinent privacy inter-
ests, the issuance of a broader or vaguer restraining order would be
both constitutionally proper and inconsistent with the second ele-
ment of the Procunier test. In the face of these contradictions the
Court did not even attempt to claim or argue that Rule 26(c) creates
only necessary or essential limitations on the First Amendment
rights of litigants. It simply proposed and then abandoned the
second element of the Procunier test.
The Court's difficulties in applying the Procunier test ultimately
follow from its conclusion that trial courts should have "broad
discretion" to decide "when a protective order is appropriate." The
Procunier test requires that each decision to issue a restraining order
be subject to First Amendment standards designed to measure the
weight or importance of the privacy interests to be protected. The
Court's refusal to impose such standards is explicable only as a
judgment that they would be incompatible with the "broad discre-
tion" that the Court wished to confer on trial courts.
This dilemma could have been softened somewhat if the Court
had attempted to justify restraining orders on the basis of a "sub-
stantial" government interest that was systemic in nature, as, for
example, the government's interest in the supervision of pretrial
discovery. Since the importance of such a systemic interest need
not be determined on a case-by-case basis, the tension between the
application of standards and the exercise of discretion would dimin-
ish. But the tension would not disappear altogether, since the ques-
tion would nevertheless remain whether any particular restraining
order was "necessary or essential" to the asserted government inter-
est.
The Court's abandonment of the second element of the Procunier
test is thus particularly revealing, for it evinces the Court's extreme
reluctance to trammel the exercise of trial court discretion by the
[1984
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application of any legal standards. This reluctance is evidence that
the Court shared the common belief, "buried deep in the hearts of
various constitutional theorists and judges," 68 that there is an "es-
sential incompatibility" between law and discretion. 69 The Court
evidently believed it had to choose between "heightened First
Amendment scrutiny" and the "broad discretion" of "the trial court
to decide when a protective order is appropriate." It could have one
or the other, but not both.
From this perspective, First Amendment rights and government
discretion are irreconcilable. "To discipline ... discretion by rule
and rote is somehow to denature it."70 One way to break out of this
impasse is to reject its premise and to view law and discretion as
complementary rather than incompatible. The Court, however,
chose not to follow this approach, and instead sought to bolster its
opinion by arguing, first, that unfettered trial court discretion was
justifiable, and, second, that litigants retained only diminished
First Amendment rights in the dissemination of discovery infor-
mation.
B. THE COURT'S JUSTIFICATION FOR DISCRETION
Official discretion to suppress speech has generally been viewed
as presumptively unconstitutional. In view of the Court's "long
line" of decisions consistently striking down as "unconstitutional
censorship" those statutes making the exercise of First Amendment
rights "contingent" upon the "discretion" of a public official, 7 one
would expect the Court carefully to analyze the particular features
of restraining orders that would justify trial court discretion in their
issuance. But the Court devoted only one short paragraph to the
issue:7
2
We also find that the provision for protective orders in the Wash-
ington Rules requires, in itself, no heightened First Amendment
scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the
trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and
68 Galligan, The Nature and Function of Policies within Discretionary Power, 1976 PUB. L. 332.
6 Smith, Thoughts on a British Conseil d'Etat, 23 PUB. AD. 23, 30 (1945).
70 Ibid.
" Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958).
72 104 S.Ct. at 2209.
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what degree of protection is required. The legislature of the
State of Washington, following the example of the Congress in
its approval of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has deter-
mined that such discretion is necessary, and we find no reason to
disagree. The trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the
competing needs and interests of the parties affected by discov-
ery. The unique character of the discovery process requires that
the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion protective or-
ders.
The passage is disappointing. The rhetoric of "deference" is mis-
leading. Neither Congress nor the Washington legislature had any-
thing to do with the formulation of Rule 26(c). The Washington
Rule was in fact issued by the Supreme Court of Washington,
which simply copied it verbatim from the federal rule promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court.73 Ultimately, the Court was
simply "deferring" to itself. Moreover, even if the fiction were
indulged that the Court were "deferring" to the independent judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of Washington in deciding to reissue
Rule 26(c), such deference is inappropriate in a First Amendment
context, where the Court has repeatedly held that "deference to a
legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amend-
ment rights are at stake. ""
The Court's observation that trial judges are in the best position
to weigh the "competing needs and interests of the parties" is
equally unhelpful. The fact that there are competing interests to be
balanced has never, by itself, been thought to require the delega-
tion of "broad" discretion.75 And the fact that a trial judge is in the
best position to assess the particular situation before him would also
" See note 44 supra. Pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 204.190, Washington rules of civil
procedure are promulgated directly by the Supreme Court of Washington and are im-
mediately effective. See Ashley v. Superior Court, 83 Wash. 2d 630, 521 P.2d 711, 715
(1974). Rule 26(c) was ordered into effect by the Washington court in 1972. 80 Wash. 2d
1191-92 (1972). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072, federal rules of civil procedure are prescribed
by the Supreme Court, and become effective ninety days after they have been "reported to
Congress by the Chief Justice." Congress has never altered the formulation of Rule 26(c) or
any of its predecessors.
7' Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978). The Court has
also noted that in First Amendment cases, less deference is due to the judgments of lower
courts than to legislative decisions, since the "judgments below ...do not come to us
encased in the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation." Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 261 (1941).
71 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S.Ct. 819, 824 (1984); Nebraska Press
Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
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not seem to be distinctive, since the same could be said in defense of
the numerous licensing statutes that the Court has struck down
because of their impermissible delegation of discretionary power to
local officials. 76 In each of these cases local officials could, with
some plausibility, have claimed to be in the best position to evaluate
the competing claims of local interests, and yet the Court has con-
sistently refused to defer to such claims.
One might defend the Court's position on the grounds that dis-
cretion in the hands of a trial judge is quite different from and more
acceptable than discretion in the hands of a local sheriff. But this
argument ultimately rests on the notion that discretion for the local
sheriff constitutes a license to engage in political discrimination,
whereas discretion for the trial judge is the freedom to obey the
law. Thus the argument fails precisely to the extent that the law
simply authorizes a judge to exercise discretion, without providing
further standards for guidance. Within the field of discretion au-
thorized by law, a judge, like a sheriff, is free to use the suppression
of speech as a tool of policy. And while judicial policy, unlike that
of local sheriffs, may not involve hostility to unpopular religious
sects, it may well involve exaggerated respect for law and social
stability.77
For this reason the Court has traditionally viewed with disfavor
judicial discretion to suppress speech. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,78
for example, a Jehovah's Witness who had played a religious
phonograph record on the street was convicted of the common-law
offense of inciting a breach of the peace. The Court noted that since
the conviction was "based on a common law concept of the most
general and undefined nature," there was a danger that the govern-
ment could "unduly suppress free communication of views, reli-
gious or otherwise, under the guise of conserving desirable condi-
76 Thus, for example, in his separate opinion in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 273
(1951), Justice Frankfurter knew the arguments for deference and stated that "this Court
should not substitute its abstract views for the informed judgment of local authorities
confirmed by local courts." Id. at 284. Frankfurter found these considerations insufficient,
however, to sustain the constitutionality of a statute giving local officials broad discretion to
grant or deny permits to speak.
"7 It has been said that underlying much First Amendment theory and doctrine is the
perception "that judges tend to be unduly risk averse in ruling upon the claims of speakers."
Blasi, Tzvards a Tbeory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REv. 11, 52 (1981).
But see Jeffries, Retbinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 426-27 (1983).
7s 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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tions."7 9 The diffuse common-law standard left "to the executive
and judicial branches too wide a discretion in its application. '" 80 In
the absence "of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish
specific conduct," therefore, judicial discretion was to be controlled
by the strict requirements of the clear and present danger test.
81
A similar distrust of judicial discretion underlies Bridges v. Califor-
nia,82 in which, relying in part on Cantwell, the Court used the clear
and present danger test sharply to curtail common-law judicial
discretion to punish by contempt out of court publications tending
to interfere with the fair and orderly administration of justice. This
same distrust explains the Court's tendency to view with disfavor
judicial injunctions that suppress speech and that are based not on
specific statutory authorization, but on vague common-law or con-
stitutional norms.83 In this respect, the broad discretion given to
trial judges to decide "when a protective order is appropriate and
what degree of protection is required" creates close structural
similarities between restraining orders and those injunctions which
the Court has in the past struck down as unconstitutional prior
84restraints.
79 Id. at 308.
80 Ibid. (emphasis added). See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 567, 573 (1973).
81 310 U.S. at 311.
82 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
83 Compare Nebraska Press, note 75 supra, New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971), and Organization for a Better Austin v. O'Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971), with Kingsley
Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). Cf. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990
(W.D. Wis. 1979).
84 The Court in Rhinebart had a great deal of difficulty distinguishing restraining orders
from "the kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny."
104 S.Ct. at 2208. The difference, the Court said, lay in the fact that restraining orders
prohibit the dissemination only of "that information obtained through use of the discovery
process," and permit the publication of "identical information" if "gained through means
independent of the court's processes." Ibid. The Court's distinction was an apparent attempt
to build on Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368
(1979), in which he argued that a judicial order closing a pretrial hearing differed from a
"classic prior restraint" because the latter "applied to information irrespective of its sources."
Id. at 399. In Rhinebart the Court makes the similar argument that restraining orders are
unlike classic prior restraints because the former prohibit speech based on only one source-
discovery information-and leave the parties free to speak about the same subject based on
information "gained through means independent of the court's processes." The trouble with
this argument is that judicial injunctions prohibiting speech based on a single source of
information have been viewed traditionally as classic prior restraints. See New York Times
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
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There might, of course, be government interests implicit in the
functioning of pretrial discovery that are sufficiently substantial to
justify the discretionary suppression of speech. But they must be
identified and analyzed, so that their implications can be carefully
assessed. For these purposes the Court's casual reference to "the
unique character of the discovery process" is clearly insufficient.
C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF LITIGANTS
One method of resolving the tension between First Amendment
rights and government discretion is to deny or diminish the First
Amendment rights. The Court in Rhinehart appeared to employ
this method. Although the Court stated that "litigants do not 'sur-
render their First Amendment rights at the courthouse door,' "85 it
also implied that these rights were of a somewhat diminished con-
stitutional significance.8 6 Since restraining orders plainly forbid
speech, the cogency of this conclusion is less than obvious.
The Court justified its conclusion on the ground that restraining
orders apply only to speech about information provided to the
litigants as a matter of "legislative grace": 87
[I]t is important to recognize the extent of the impairment of
First Amendment rights that a protective order, such as the one
at issue here, may cause. As in all civil litigation, petitioners
gained the information they wish to disseminate only by virtue
of the trial court's discovery processes. As the rules authorizing
discovery were adopted by the state legislature, the processes
thereunder are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no
First Amendment right of access to information made available
s 104 S.Ct. at 2207 n. 18. The Court candidly acknowledged that defendants' speech did
not fall "within the classes of unprotected speech" such as "fighting words" or obscenity, and
that "there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about" the plaintiffs, an interest
that "may well include most-and possibly all-of what has been discovered as a result of
the court's order." 104 S.Ct. at 2206-07. These acknowledgments must be understood as an
implicit rejection of the approach of the Supreme Court of Washington, which had argued
that there was only a minimal public interest in the conduct of "civil actions," and that
defendants' First Amendment rights were somehow diminished because their speech did not
involve "advocacy or abstract discussion," but "only the reporting of supposed facts elicited
in discovery." 654 P.2d at 686-88.
" The Court was somewhat unclear on this point, but concluded its discussion of litigants'
First Amendment interests with the observation that "judicial limitations on a party's ability
to disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment
rights of the restricted party to a far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemination of
information in a different context." 104 S.Ct. at 2208.
17 104 S.Ct. at 2207.
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to him only for purposes of trying his suit.... Thus, continued
court control over the discovered information does not raise the
same spectre of government censorship that such control might
suggest in other situations. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d, at 206-07
(Wilkey, J., dissenting).
The Court's reasoning is open to several interpretations. The
first, suggested by the Court's reference to Judge Wilkey's dissent-
ing opinion in In re Halkin, is that litigants receiving discovery
information have only a "limited" First Amendment right in its
dissemination, since they receive it "already subject to the courts'
exercise of [a] discretionary power" of restraint.88 As Judge Wilkey
forthrightly acknowledged, however, this reasoning is "very analo-
gous to the view taken by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in Arnett v. Ken-
nedy with respect to one's property interest in a government job.
Therein Mr. Justice Rehnquist concluded that 'the property inter-
est which appellee had in his [nonprobationary federal] employ-
ment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which
had accompanied the grant of that interest.' "89
The difficulty with this argument is that Rehnquist's position in
Arnett was specifically rejected by six other Justices,9 ° including
Justice Powell, who noted thai Rehnquist's reasoning failed to per-
ceive that even if benefits are received as a matter of "legislative
grace," constitutional rights are not.9 Later decisions of the Court
have reiterated this rejection of Rehnquist's position,92 and it is
" In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 206 (vilkey, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 207.
o Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 153, 166-67 (1974) (opinion of Powell, J., joined by
Blackmun, J.); 177-78 (opinion of White, J.); 210-11 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by
Douglas and Brennan, JJ.).
91 416 U.S. at 166-67 (Powell, J., concurring). But see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 586-
87 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). For recent studies of the vagaries of the Court's approach to
the "right-privilege" distinction, and to its first cousin, the doctrine of "unconstitutional
conditions," see Kreimer, Allocation Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984); Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Ditinction in
Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982); Easterbrook,
Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUPREME COURT REvIEW 85; Terrell, "Property," "Due Pro-
cess," and the Distinction between Definition and Theory in LegalAnalysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861 (1982);
Westin, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture ofAnother, 66
IOWA L. REv. 741 (1981); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privieges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 SUPREME COURT REVIEw 309, 348.
9' See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431-32 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 490 n.6 (1980).
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implausible that Justice Powell meant by his unelaborated refer-
ence to Judge Wilkey suddenly to revive Rehnquist's approach.
A second interpretation of the Court's reasoning is that the legisla-
ture can condition production of discovery information on the sac-
rifice of First Amendment interests in the dissemination of such
information. 93 So characterized, however, this interpretation
would appear to conflict with the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions. In its most extreme formulation, the doctrine holds that
First Amendment rights may not "be infringed by the denial of or
placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."94 A more realistic
view of the doctrine is that it functions primarily to deny that
conditions placed upon the receipt of government benefits are con-
stitutional simply because the benefits are a matter of legislative
grace. The work of constitutionally analyzing such conditions must
proceed free of any such conclusive arguments. 9 Even in this more
restricted form, however, the doctrine is in tension with the Court's
opinion, which attempts to make just such a conclusive argument.
The Court's position may nevertheless be defended on the
grounds that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions ought not
to apply to speech about discovery information. The argument
could be made that the doctrine should only be applied to cases in
which government conditions the receipt of state benefits on the
sacrifice of constitutional rights that individuals would otherwise be
free to exercise. Since there is no right or ability to speak about
discovery information before it is provided by the government, the
9' This interpretation differs from the first in that it is not, like Justice Rehnquist's view in
Arnett, predicated on the assumption that constitutional rights can be defined by legislative
benefits. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Justice Powell quoted without expressly
.approving the Washington Supreme Court's observation that participation in discovery con-
stitutes a "waiver" of First Amendment rights. See 104 S.Ct. at 2205 n.9. That observation is
untenable. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967);Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964)
("constitutional problems" resulting from any theory that constitutional rights are waived
merely from exercising "right of access to the federal courts").
94 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
95 The Sherbert Court recognized that the benefits at issue were a matter of legislative
grace, but nonetheless examined the conditions on their receipt to determine if they were
supported by a "compelling state interest." 374 U.S. at 403, 406-09. There was thus no
conclusive presumption of either constitutionality or nonconstitutionality. See generally
Westin, note 91 supra, at 748-51; Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State:
Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector, 40 WASH. L. REv. 10 (1965); Van Alstyne, The
Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy,
16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 751 (1969).
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HeinOnline -- 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 189 1984
190 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
doctrine should have no application. In Sherbert v. Verner, for ex-
ample, a Seventh-Day Adventist who believed as an article of reli-
gious faith that Saturday labor was forbidden, was required to
work on Saturday as a condition of receiving unemployment com-
pensation benefits.96 The premise of the Court's decision was that
in the absence of government action, the Adventist was free to
exercise her religious beliefs by refraining from Saturday labor.
Conditioning unemployment benefits on Saturday labor functioned
to "compel" her to violate these beliefs. There does not seem to be a
similar compulsion operating on litigants, who cannot exercise their
right to speak about discovery information until the government
has acted to provide it to them.
This approach does seem to capture something of the unique
character of restraining orders. Underlying it are two distinct lines
of thought that need to be separately addressed. The first is that
placing conditions on the receipt of discovery information does not
compel litigants to sacrifice a preexisting constitutional right, since
litigants cannot speak about information they do not yet have. This
argument is unsatisfactory because it would make the constitutional
analysis of a restraining order turn on the arbitrary circumstance of
whether the order was issued before or after the receipt of discov-
ery information. In Halkin, for example, the restraining order was
issued only after litigants had received discovery information and
had given written notice that they intended to release it to the
press.97 Therefore the restraining order did in fact deprive litigants
of a constitutional right to speak that they otherwise could have
exercised.98 Similarly, the restraining order in Rhinebart was issued
after some discovery information had already been produced. 99 To
apply a different constitutional analysis to this information would
be bizarre, and it certainly does not appear to have been the Court's
intention. Indeed, by strongly indicating its disapproval of Halkin,
the Court signaled that its analysis could not be predicated upon
96 374 U.S. at 399-401.
97 598 F.2d at 180-81.
9' It is thus doubtful that Judge Wilkey, in his Halkin dissent, meant to rest his argument
on the absence of any preexisting constitutional right. Wilkey emphasized that it made no
difference to his analysis of the de mininis nature of litigants' First Amendment rights
whether a restraining order was issued "before or after the litigant's receipt of information." Id.
at 207.
99 See note 43 supra.
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whether a restraining order was issued before or after the produc-
tion of discovery information.
The Court's point, therefore, must be interpreted more broadly
to mean that conditioning discovery on the sacrifice of First
Amendment rights is permissible whenever the provision of the
information makes possible the very exercise of these rights. The
argument for this position is that the "spectre of government cen-
sorship" is reduced in such circumstances because the government
retains the option to withhold the information that makes the rights
exist at all.
This argument is both inconsistent with precedent and practi-
cally unsound. Indeed, little more than a month after Rhinebart the
Court decided FCC v. League of Women Voters,'0° which held that
government contributions to noncommercial educational stations
could not be conditioned upon a prohibition of the stations' edito-
rial speech, even if such speech were made possible by the contri-
butions. League of Women Voters is simply the latest in a line of
decisions rejecting the contention that First Amendment rights
made possible by government action can be prohibited by the gov-
ernment. Although the federal government created the United
States mail as a matter of legislative grace, for example, it may not
condition access to the mails upon the sacrifice of those First
Amendment rights made possible by the use of the mail. The Court
has held that "grave constitutional questions are immediately raised
once it is said that the use of the mails is a privilege which may be
extended or withheld on any grounds whatsoever."' 1 Similarly,
even if a local government builds a municipal auditorium that
makes possible the exercise of First Amendment rights associated
with theatrical productions, the availability of the auditorium must
be "bounded by precise and clear standards," since, "the danger of
censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment
freedoms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over
a forum's use. '' 02
Viewed from this perspective, it is false to say, as the Court
100 104 S.Ct. 3106 (1984).
101 Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946).
102 Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553, 556 (1975). See also Madison
School District v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 176 (1976); Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 181-83 (1972).
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implies, that the "spectre of government censorship" is less when
government action makes possible the exercise of First Amendment
rights. It does not take much imagination, for example, to envision
the government's making the mail service selectively available to
presidential candidates on the basis of their political views, or
judges' imposing restraining orders on the basis of litigants' political
affiliations. It is not, therefore, that the specter of censorship is
reduced; it is rather that the Court believed the risk of censorship to
be justifiable in the context of civil discovery. But at bottom this is
a belief about the process of discovery, rather than about the nature
of litigants' First Amendment rights.
The Court might have believed that the concept of a "dimin-
ished" First Amendment right would function both to permit the
exercise of official discretion and to prohibit flagrant abuse such as
overt political discrimination. But this use of the concept appears
arbitrary and unsupported, since it is not clear why the concept
would function in this manner. The Court made no effort to derive
this function from traditional theories of freedom of expression,
and it is unlikely that any such effort would have proved successful.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that "the operations of the courts
and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public
concern,"'10 3 and reference to discovery information can often be
necessary to litigants' public evaluation of the judicial management
of a case. Whether one examines such speech from the perspective
of the "marketplace of ideas, ' 4 or of the information flow neces-
sary for democratic self-governance, 10 5 or of the "self-fulfillment" of
the speaker, 106 or of the "autonomy" of the listener, 107 there does
not appear to be any reason to conclude that litigants' rights in the
dissemination of discovery information are in any respect di-
minished.
In prior cases, moreover, the Court has properly and carefully
distinguished between a right of access to information and a right to
103 Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978). See note 85 supra.
104 See, e.g., SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-34 (1982); Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
los See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE (1948); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937).
106 See, e.g., EMERSON, THE SYSTEII OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 6 (1970).
107 See, e.g., Scanlon, A Theory ofFreedom ofExpression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972).
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disseminate such information once access has been obtained. Thus
even in situations where government may legitimately bar access to
information, the Court has found that First Amendment rights of
dissemination can continue undiminished. 108 In particular circum-
stances, of course, such rights may be subordinated to appropriate
government interests in regulation. But in these circumstances it is
more productive to focus on the nature of the asserted government
interests, rather than on an undefined and intuitive diminution of
First Amendment rights. Government interests in regulation are
public and can provide the basis for constitutional dialogue. Thus,
for example, if the Court were to have asserted that specific charac-
teristics of the discovery process justify the need for trial court
discretion to suppress speech, such an assertion could be made the
subject of salutory and rational discussion. But discussion is ended
by the deus ex machina appearance of a "diminished" First Amend-
ment right that is unrelated to First Amendment theory or prece-
dent, and that has content and contours that are neither described
nor explained.
III. THE MANAGEMENT OF SPEECH AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF DISCOVERY
The Court in Rhinehart was determined to reach a result that
would insulate discretionary control over pretrial discovery from
First Amendment challenge. The Court's difficulty in justifying
this result can be explained in part by its reliance on traditional
doctrinal formulations that embody values peripheral to the inter-
ests the Court was actually trying to protect. The Court never
articulated these interests, but it provided us a clue to their nature
by its reference to Procunier as the appropriate framework for First
Amendment analysis. At first blush this reference seems peculiar:
the First Amendment rights of prisoners do not seem an obvious
standard for those of litigants. But the justification for the reference
is made somewhat clearer by the subsequent citation of Brown v.
Glines, 109 in which the Court discussed the discretionary suppres-
108 See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); New
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
109 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
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sion of First Amendment rights in the military.' 10 What Procunier
and Brown have in common is that both address the relationship
betwveen First Amendment rights and the internal management of a
government institution.
The citation of these cases implies that underlying the Court's
decision is the notion that pretrial discovery is a regime of judicial
administration, rather than adjudication. From this perspective,
the rules of civil procedure do not give litigants "rights" to informa-
tion that must be adjudicated before a neutral and umpireal judge,
but rather create a system of information exchange to be actively
managed by a judge so as to secure "the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action."'1 This perspective, of course,
was explicitly adopted by the drafters of the 1983 amendments to
the Federal Rules, which "encourage forceful judicial management"
of "the entire pretrial phase, especially motions and discovery.""' 2
In his role as manager, the trial judge must consult not merely the
interests of the particular parties before him, but the needs of the
entire institution of pretrial discovery. He must make decisions
based upon their effects on "other parties to other lawsuits.'113
Administration of the system of pretrial discovery requires the
continual exercise of judgment: judgment about whether "a party's
aim is to delay bringing a case to trial, or embarrass or harass the
person from whom he seeks discovery"; 114 judgment about how to
"'0 The citations to Procunier and to Glines are followed by a reference to "Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)." 104 S.Ct. at 2207. This reference seems to be a mistake. The
Court in Buckley explicitly refused to employ the test of United States v. O'Brien, upon
which the formulations in both Procunier and Glines are based. The language in Buckley cited
by the Rhinehart Court is instead an effort to apply the "closest scrutiny," which is not the
Court's intention in Rhinehart, and which was not its purpose in either Procunier or Glines.
". Wash. Super. Ct. C.R. 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. For a discussion of the emerging contrast
between the managerial and umpireal images of the judge, see Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982); Kritzer, The Judge's Role in Pretrial Case Processing: Assesing the Need
for Change, 66 JUDICATURE 28, 30 (June-July 1982).
12 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 16, 97 F.R.D. 207, 213 (1983). Justice Powell has
stressed the "pressing need for judicial supervision" of discovery to prevent abuse. ACF
Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1087 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
113 National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643
(1976). See Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26, 97 F.R.D. 220 (1983). To adopt the
language of the sociologist Philip Selznik, one might say that the judge's objective in adminis-
tering pretrial discovery is "to achieve a desired outcome" rather than to attain "justice"
between the parties. SELZNICK, LAw, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 16 (1969).
.. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 353 n.17 (1978).
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instill "in counsel a sense of responsibility that will serve as a polic-
ing agent against harassment and oppression";" 5 judgment about
when discovery has become financially oppressive; 1 6 judgment
about when to teach counsel a lesson. 117 No set of rules could
comprehend the exercise of such judgment, 118 and for that reason
"flexibility and experience are the keys to efficient management" of
pretrial discovery. 9 Need for this flexibility has traditionally been
recognized in the expansive authority and broad discretionary con-
trol to supervise the discovery process given to trial judges by both
the Federal and Washington rules. 20 "A judge must have discre-
tion," as one jurist put it in a different context, "because without it
the business could not go on."'121
"I Pollack, note 24 supra, at 225.
116 SCM Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial and Commercial Research Corp., 72
F.R.D. 110, 112 (N.D. Tex. 1976); GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTE.MI 182-85 (1968); Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D.
521, 523 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
117 Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1047 (1978).
... The trial judge is somewhat in the position of the police officers described by James Q.
Wilson, for whom "no very useful-certainly no complete-set of instructions can be de-
vised as to what the officer should do with, say, quarreling lovers. Defining a policy in such
matters is difficult, not because the police have not given much thought to the matters or
because they do not know how they should be handled, but because so much depends on the
particular circumstances of time, place, event, and personality. Psychiatrists do not use 'how
to do it' manuals, and they have the advantage of dealing with people at leisure, over
protracted periods of time, and in periods of relative calm." WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE
BEHAVIOR 65-66 (1968).
... Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 16, 97 F.R.D. 211 (1983).
120 See text at notes 14-16 & note 44 supra. The managerial perspective of pretrial discov-
ery has been explicitly articulated primarily by those who have recently commented on the
Federal Rules. The fact that this perspective has not been articulated in Washington law may
have been one source of the Court's indirection in specifying the government interests at
stake in Rule 26(c). But it is fair to say that from their promulgation in 1938, the Federal
Rules of discovery implicitly envisioned the trial judge as a manager engaged in the "efficient
administration" of justice, and to this end created a "judge-centered procedural model"
which left trial judges "unfettered by rules" and able to meet "various situations... by wide
exercise of judicial discretion." Fish, Guarding the Judicial Ramparts: John J. Parker and the
Administration of Federal Justice, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 105, 113 (1978). See Resnik, note 111 supra, at
391; Cuter, Discovery-Civil Litigation's Fading Light: A Lawyer Looks at the Federal Discovery
Rules after Forty Years of Use, 52 TEM. L. Q. 933, 936-37 (1979). Since Washington has
essentially adopted all of the federal rules of discovery, with their philosophy of liberal
information exchange and discretionary judicial control, it might also be said to have adopted
the managerial perspective underlying these rules. At least, so the Court might have
thought, Washington should constitutionally be free to adopt such a perspective if it should
choose to do so.
12, Reg. v. Winsor, 10 Cox C.C. 276, 321 (1866). See, e.g., Otero v. Buslee, 695 F.2d
1244, 1248 n.1 (10th Cir. 1982).
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On this account, the crux of Rhinehart is neither the protection of
privacy interests nor the diminishment of litigants' First Amend-
ment interests, but rather the Court's perception that discretionary
authority to issue restraining orders is essential for the administra-
tion of pretrial discovery. In this sense, the government's interests
in restraining orders may be analogous to its interests in the man-
agement of other government institutions such as schools or pris-
ons. These interests are quite different from those at stake when the
government regulates the speech of the general public, as in the
many cases where the Court has struck down discretionary author-
ity to suppress speech.
The Court adverted to these management interests by its citation
of precedents such as Procunier and Glines. Whether these prece-
dents actually bear on the issues presented in Rhinehart, however,
depends upon whether the government can be said to have generic
interests in the regulation of state institutions, and whether these
interests significantly affect applicable First Amendment stan-
dards.
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE MANAGEMENT
OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
Although the Court has several times noted that "First Amend-
ment guarantees must be 'applied in light of the special characteris-
tics of the . . . environment,' "122 the Court has not developed a
systematic approach for the application of First Amendment stan-
dards to the management of government institutions. The Court
has decided cases dealing with the assertion of First Amendment
rights in the context of prisons,123 the military, 124 government em-
ployment, 125 and schools, 126 but it has yet to provide any articula-
tion of the structural similarities that unite these decisions.
122 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 410 (1974), quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, 313 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
123 SeeJones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 410 (1974).
'24 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
125 Connick v. Myers, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (1983); Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
School District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968);
cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
126 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 313 U.S.
503 (1969).
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These similarities derive from the nature of government institu-
tions, which are organizations "formally established for the explicit
purpose of achieving certain goals."' 27 The goal of the military is
the national defense; the goal of the school system is education.
Government institutions, like most formal organizations, have ex-
plicit authority structures that are integral to their capacity to attain
institutional goals.' 28 Authority in government institutions typi-
cally extends to the speech as well as to the conduct of those subject
to the management of the organization. For this reason speech that
is insubordinate, that is expressed by those within an organization
in defiance of its authority structure, threatens the ability of the
institution to function.
The government's interests in the effective management of an
institution are essentially its interests in the attainment of the in-
stitution's goals. The government therefore has rather strong inter-
ests in the regulation of insubordinate speech. These interests have
three characteristics pertinent to the present inquiry. First, as the
management of speech becomes more detailed and comprehensive,
it makes little sense to distinguish between "prior restraints" and
"subsequent punishments." Government organizations, for ex-
ample, often require subordinates to clear with their superiors
work-related memoranda before distribution. Constitutional analy-
sis of such requirements should not turn on whether they can be
characterized as imposing "prior restraints."
Second, within government institutions the distinction between
permissible and impermissible speech routinely and necessarily
turns on content. School boards, for example, characteristically
instruct teachers that they are to use one curriculum rather than
another; superiors characteristically instruct subordinates that they
are to support at staff meetings one position rather than another;
127 BLAu & SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 5 (1962). On the ambiguities of the concept
of a "goal," see SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL AND OPEN SYSTEMS 261-
64 (1981). In this article I will refer to an institution's "public" rather than "actual" goals.
Public goals legitimate the institution in the eyes of the general society. ETZIONI, A CoI-
PARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 72 n. 1 (1961). I do not mean to use the
term "goal" to refer in any sense to the process of an organization's internal legitimation, or to
imply that government organizations have become "infused with value" and hence have
undergone what Selznick has described as a transition from organization to institution.
SELZNIcK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 40, 134-
42 (1957). See PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 186-89 (1979).
128 See, e.g., SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 134-35 (1958); MARCH & SIMON, OR-
GANIZATIONS 194 (1958); BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 159-84 (1968).
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generals characteristically instruct colonels that they are to formu-
late one kind of defensive plan rather than another. The manage-
ment of speech within government institutions is thus an exception
to the Court's often stated principle that "the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject, or its content.' 129
Third, government interests in the management of speech extend
not merely to avoidance of damage caused by the particular speech
regulated, but also to the integrity of the authority structure by
which the speech is regulated. If insubordinate speech is constitu-
tionally protected, the government will suffer not only the impact
of the speech itself, but also a corresponding impairment of its
authority, which may well have implications for its ability to man-
age other kinds of speech and conduct.
Although the government has a strong interest in the regulation
of insubordinate speech, there may nevertheless be good reasons to
extend constitutional protection to such speech. First Amendment
values of individual "self-realization"13 do not disappear simply
because individuals choose to speak within the context of a govern-
ment organization. Insubordinate speech may also provide a source
of information that is important for the democratic supervision of
government institutions. Although there is thus a tension betveen
government interests and First Amendment values, the tenor of the
Court's decisions in this area is that government institutions may
discipline insubordinate speech that interferes with the accomplish-
ment of institutional purposes. 3' The Court's remarks in Tinker v.
Des Moines School District are illustrative: "[C]onduct by the student,
in class or out of it, which for any reason-whether it stems from
129 Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See, e.g., Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-41 (1980).
13o See, e.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV.
1, 5-9 (1976).
13 See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356-57 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 758 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129-33 (1977); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972).
In its most recent discussion of the power of the government to regulate the speech of its
employees, the Court stated that the Constitution "requires full consideration of the govern-
ment's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public."
Connick v. Myers, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1692 (1983). The Court also added a threshold test, to the
effect that if employee expression "cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a
matter of public concern," government sanctions for the expression would not be subject to
constitutional review. Id. at 1689-90.
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time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others, is,
of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of speech.
132
Although the Court is unlikely to immunize insubordinate
speech that impairs the ability of a government institution to func-
tion, it will undertake its own independent inquiry into whether an
institution's regulation of speech is necessary for attainment of or-
ganizational goals. This inquiry characteristically examines the au-
thority structure of the relevant institution to determine the effect
of constitutionally restricting its capacity to define and discipline
the kind of insubordinate speech at issue. If the Court determines
that the institution's legitimate authority structure will not be un-
duly damaged, it will then proceed to assess the impact of the
particular speech at issue. These two aspects of constitutional in-
quiry are nicely illustrated in the contrast bet-ween Brown v. Glines
and Tinker v. Des Moines School District.
In Glines, the Court upheld a military regulation prohibiting Air
Force members from circulating petitions on military bases without
prior approval of their commander.' 33 The regulation permitted
base commanders to censor any petition they felt would create "a
clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale" of their troops. 13 4
The Court did not consider it to be important that the regulation
was a prior restraint and that it allowed censorship on the basis of
the content of speech. The Court also did not ask whether the
specific speech at issue would in fact have created a danger to
loyalty, discipline or morale. Instead the Court rested its conclu-
sion on the importance to the institution of the military to maintain
"~a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian
life135 "The rights of military men must yield somewhat 'to meet
certain overriding demands of discipline and duty. . . .' Speech
likely to interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effec-
tiveness therefore can be excluded from a military base." In the
Court's view "the military mission" required creation of a form of
132 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
"' 444 U.S. at 349.
134 Id. at 350.
' Id. at 354.
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authority founded on "instinctive obedience."136 The overriding
constitutional concern was the maintenance of this kind of author-
ity, 137 regardless of the effects of the particular speech at issue.
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, on the other hand, the
Court was unwilling to place a constitutional imprimatur on this
kind of authority. In Tinker the Court struck down a school regula-
tion prohibiting the wearing of black armbands to protest the Viet-
nam war. The Court rested its conclusion on the premise that "[i]n
our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitari-
anism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their
students."'38 Hence school officials, unlike military commanders,
could not prohibit expression on the basis of an "undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance," but could only act on the
basis of "facts which might reasonably have led [them] to forecast
substantial disruption of or material interference with school activi-
ties." '139 Since these facts were absent in Tinker, the Court found the
regulation unconstitutional.
The difference between the First Amendment standard applied
in Tinker and that applied in Glines rests on a form of constitutional
sociology, on the Court's judgment about the structure of authority
appropriate and necessary for different government institutions. In
Tinker the Court believed that schools could continue to function
even though they were prevented from regulating certain kinds of
speech in the absence of evidence sufficient to convince a reviewing
court that censorship was necessary to avoid disruption. In Glines
the Court believed that the need for unquestioned military author-
ity was more important than the propriety of any particular exer-
cise of that authority. In both Tinker and Glines, government offi-
cials were empowered to suppress speech that interfered with the
effective functioning of their institutions, but the needs of military
authority, unlike those of school officials, were deemed to require
136 Id. at 354, 357.
137 The Court indicated that such authority was not unlimited, stating that "commanders
may sometimes apply these regulations 'irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily,' thus giving
rise to legitimate claims under the First Amendment." Id. at 357 n. 15. The qualification
should be understood as the Court's reservation of ultimate authority to determine whether
the purpose of military censorship is the achievement of institutionally legitimate ends.
138 393 U.S. at 511.
139 Id. at 508.
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that the military retain "substantial discretion over its internal dis-
cipline" in the regulation of insubordinate speech. 14 0
When it comes to the regulation of insubordinate speech, there-
fore, the ordinary relationship between the First Amendment and
discretion is inverted. If government officials act to regulate the
speech of the general public, the First Amendment usually imposes
strict limitations on the administrative discretion that can be dele-
gated to such officials. But when these same officials act to manage
speech within the context of a government institution, the adminis-
trative discretion constitutionally deemed necessary for effective
management determines the First Amendment standard to be ap-
plied. 141
B. RESTRAINING ORDERS AND THE MANAGEMENT
OF PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
The relationship between the First Amendment and discretion is
thus significantly affected by the context of the government regula-
tion at issue. If the regulation occurs in the context of the internal
management of a state institution, the First Amendment will per-
mit such discretion as is necessary for the effective management of
the institution. The question, therefore, is whether restraining or-
ders should constitutionally be viewed as involving the internal
management of the court system.
We ordinarily think of trial courts as adjudicative institutions
which govern litigants by law rather than by "managerial direc-
'40 444 U.S. at 357.
141 In Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), the Court endorsed the use of a
contract, "voluntarily signed" without "duress," as a basis for regulating the speech of a
former CIA employee. Id. at 509 n.3. Snepp, however, provides a poor basis from which to
generalize about government regulation of insubordinate speech. This is because the decision
ultimately rests on the concept of "consent." But consent is not present in various manage-
ment situations, as, for example, those in schools, prisons, or the military. See note 93 supra.
Moreover the line between voluntary and involuntary consent is difficult to draw in manage-
ment situations. For example, when government requires as a condition of employment that
employees sign explicit contracts forgoing First Amendment rights, serious questions can
and should arise concerning the validity of such "consent." See, e.g., National Security
Decision Directive 84, Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the
United States Senate, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (September 13, 1984); Powe, The Constitu-
tional Implications of President Reagan's Censorship Directive 84, THE CENTER MAGAZINE 8
(March/April 1984). The issue, therefore, is more directly addressed by asking whether
government has the power to regulate insubordinate speech, rather than whether it can
wring "consent" to such regulation from its employees.
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tion."14 2 But the judicial system, like any other government institu-
tion, needs to accomplish its goals, which may for convenience be
taken to be those specified in both the Federal and Washington
rules: the securing of "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action." '143 To accomplish these ends, trial courts are
traditionally vested with administrative authority. This can plainly
be seen in a trial court's supervision of its courtroom. The trial
judge has been accurately described as "the executive of the court-
room. Among his duties and powers are those of presiding, of
preserving order and decorum, of regulating the conduct of those
who participate in the proceedings, and of directing and guiding
such proceedings... to the end that there may be such economy of
time, effort, and expense as is commensurate with the rights of the
parties to present their claims and defenses.""'4
The trial judge's management of the courtroom extends to the
regulation of speech. Even in Bridges v. California, when the Court,
speaking through Justice Black, imposed strict limitations on a trial
judge's capacity to punish by contempt the out-of-court speech of
nonparties, the Court made a point of strongly reaffirming the
constitutional power of trial judges "to protect themselves from
disturbances and disorder in the court room by use of contempt
proceedings." 45 Courtroom speech can be regulated on the basis of
its content, as, for example, when courts permit argument on cer-
tain points rather than others, or punish by contempt remarks they
142 FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 210 (1969). Fuller views the "basic difference be-
tween law and managerial direction" to be that "law is not, like management, a matter of
directing other persons how to accomplish tasks set by a superior, but is basically a matter of
providing the citizenry with a sound and stable framework for their interactions with one
another." Ibid.
"I Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Wash. C. R. 1.
'44 BOWERS, THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURTS 10 (1931). See Smith v.
Smith, 17 N.J. Super. 128, 85 A.2d 523 (1951); Amo v. Genovese, 17 N.J. Super. 109, 85
A.2d 529 (1951). Trial courts have traditionally been accorded "discretion" in the exercise of
these administrative responsibilities. See BOWERS, at 267-492; McKean, Some Aspects of
Judicial Discretion, 40 DICK. L. REV. 168, 170-71 (1936).
115 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 266 (1941). In Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,
383 (1962), a case concerned with the trial court punishment of out-of-court speech, the
Court states: "We start with the premise that the right of courts to conduct their business in
an untrammeled way lies at the foundation of our system of government and that courts
necessarily must possess the means of punishing for contempt when conduct tends directly
to prevent the discharge of their functions ... [Clourts have continuously had the authority
and power to maintain order in their courtrooms and to assure litigants a fair trial ..."
202 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 11984
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consider insulting. 146 And courtroom speech is commonly regu-
lated in ways that in other contexts would constitute prior re-
straints, as, for example, when a judge reviews evidence to decide
whether it can be given to the jury. Such regulation is not thought
to raise particular First Amendment problems, and this is what one
would expect if the regulation were an issue of internal managerial
authority.
The premise of the movement toward "case management" 14 7 is
that this same kind of managerial authority should extend to the
pretrial process. This is consistent with the original design of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which "vindicated a particular
version of judicial administration that sharply modified the preex-
isting adversary control over all aspects of litigation" and "estab-
lished on a secure footing the power of the judge as the manager of
the case.'1 48 In complex cases this pretrial managerial power has
long been self-consciously exercised. The epigraph to the Manual
for Complex Litigation, for example, states: "There are no inherently
protracted cases, only cases which are unnecessarily protracted by
inefficient procedures and management."' 49 And in 1983 the pre-
trial managerial authority of the trial judge was strongly emphasized
in the amendments to the federal rules, which explicitly encourage
"forceful judicial management" of "the entire-pretrial phase, espe-
cially motions and discovery."' 5
°
146 "Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested ... with power to impose
silence, respect and decorum in their presence, . . . and as a corollary to this proposition, to
preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution." Anderson
v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821). See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544-46 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); Dobbs, Contempt of Court:
A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 186-207 (1971).
147 FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DIS-
TRICT COURTS (1977). For a good survey of the literature on case management, see Resnik,
note 11l supra.
14' Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983
DUKE L.J. 1265, 1271. See CONNOLLY, HOLLEMAN, & KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS
AND THE CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: DISCOVERY 14 (1978). Since Washington has adopted
the federal rules, it might also be viewed as having adopted the managerial perspective
underlying these rules. See note 120 supra.
149 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, at v.
150 97 F.R.D. 207, 213. "[C]lose supervision of discovery" has been termed "the most
widespread and urgent policy concern today about the way that the litigation system func-
tions." Flanders, Blind Umpires-a Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HAST. L.J. 505, 514-15 &
n.49 (1984).
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When a trial court exercises managerial control of the courtroom,
however, there is little chance for confusion about whether an indi-
vidual is within its administrative authority. In this respect a trial
judge's courtroom governance is like that of a school administrator:
it is generally clear enough whether a student is or is not subject to
school regulation. But managerial and nonmanagerial authority
cannot be so clearly distinguished during the pretrial phase of liti-
gation. If a school were to promulgate a dress code that forbade the
wearing of jeans while at home, we would say that the code was not
an exercise of managerial authority, since it had nothing to do with
the running of the school. 151 But a trial judge can issue a restraining
order that prohibits litigants from speaking even though they are
not in the actual or constructive presence of the court. The question
is whether such an order is an exercise of managerial authority.
The question is illuminated by the Court's decisions in the area
of government employment. Government agencies sometimes at-
tempt to extend their managerial authority to employee speech that
occurs out of the office. In Pickering v. Board of Education,' 5 2 for
example, a teacher had been dismissed for sending a letter to a
newspaper that was critical of the school board. Since the teacher's
speech neither "impeded [his] proper performance of his daily
duties in the classroom" nor "interfered with the regular operation
of the schools generally," the Court concluded that "the interests of
the school administration" in controlling the speech were "not
significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribu-
tion by any member of the general public."' 5 3 The government, in
other words, could not invoke its interests as a manager to justify
regulation of the speech, even though the speech may have ad-
versely affected the school administration's ability to achieve in-
stitutional goals. "4
'"s See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1081 (1980).
IS2 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
s' Id. at 572-73.
1S4 In a recent line of cases, the Court has used the "public forum" doctrine to develop
First Amendment standards concerning the capacity of government institutions to regulate
members of the general public seeking to use the instrumentalities of the institution to assist
them in their speech. See Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S.Ct.
948 (1983); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
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When a trial court issues a gag order prohibiting the press from
writing about a pending criminal trial, the court is in a similar
position to the school board in Pickering. It is attempting to regulate
speech that will adversely affect the operation of the judicial sys-
tem, but over which it has no specifically managerial interests. The
court's regulation of the press must therefore be viewed as an at-
tempt to govern the general public.
The situation is different, however, when a trial court issues a
restraining order prohibiting a litigant from speaking about discov-
ery information obtained through the court's own processes. The
court is directly engaged in the supervision of the pretrial activities
of the litigant, and its decisions in the course of that supervision
will directly depend on whether the litigant can speak about discov-
ery information. In cases involving commercially sensitive informa-
tion, for example, a court may be willing to order discovery only if
it can be assured that the information will remain confidential. If a
court is uncertain whether pertinent information is being sought for
proper or improper purposes, it may choose to order production of
the information only if it can ensure that the information will be
properly used. In such situations restraining orders are necessary to
achieve the pretrial exchange of information thought prerequisite
for the effective functioning of the judicial system.
To view restraining orders as an exercise of managerial authority
is essentially to see them as ancillary to a trial court's task of declar-
ing the law between the parties. They are a tool used by the trial
court to control the behavior of parties so as to create the conditions
of achieving a just resolution of their dispute. "' The First Amend-
ment will permit employment of this tool if it is necessary to attain
the legitimate objectives of the judicial system.' 6 And, more im-
1'5 This is the manner in which the Court viewed the old "bill of discovery" that was
superseded by the modern federal rules. The bill was seen as "an auxiliary process in aid of
trial at law" whose function was "to give facility to proof." Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins
Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 685, 693 (1933).
"I The Court has clearly indicated that the First Amendment will not protect insubordi-
nate speech that interferes with the ability of the judicial system to attain its institutional
ends. See note 145 supra. In 1966.the Court, speaking in the context of prejudicial pretrial
publicity, concluded that a trial court could prohibit the out-of-court speech of "prosecutors,
counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff [and] enforcement officers coming
under the jurisdiction of the court" if such speech would "frustrate its function." Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 n.21
(1981).
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portant, the First Amendment will also cede to trial judges discre-
tion to determine if a particular restraining order is necessary to
attain such legitimate objectives, but only if it can also be demon-
strated that such discretion is essential for effective management of
pretrial discovery.
The constitutionality of the "broad discretion" authorized by
Rule 26(c) will thus depend upon an inquiry into the nature and
extent of the discretion necessary to control pretrial discovery. But
the Court's implicit premise that law and discretion are incompat-
ible makes such an inquiry impossible, for it implies that all legal
restraint on judicial discretion is unacceptable. The premise ren-
ders trial court discretion constitutional by definition. It is thus
inconsistent with sensitive constitutional analysis, and with any
serious investigation into the means whereby rights and discretion
may be accommodated. The premise is, moreover, factually false.
IV. THREE PERSPECTIVES ON DISCRETION
Without doubt the prevailing conception of discretion is that
it "signifies choice."1 7 Maurice Rosenberg, for example, has writ-
ten that "if the word discretion conveys to legal minds any solid
core of meaning, one central idea above all the others, it is the idea
of choice."' 58 And Kenneth Davis has defined an official as having
discretion if "the effective limits on his power leave him free to
make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction. '' 59
This view of discretion prevails in Supreme Court opinions.
Whenever the Court speaks, as it often does, of the "deference
' Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C. App. 1979). See Smith v. Smith,
17 N.J. Super. 128, 85 A.2d 523, 524 (N.J. App. 1951) (" '[Jiudicial discretion' is the option
which a judge may exercise between the doing and the not doing of a thing which cannot be
demanded as an absolute legal right. . ."); Wendel v. Swanberg, 384 Mich. 468, 185 N.W.2d
348, 351 (1971) ("The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice ... ").
"' Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 635, 636 (1971). See Dworkin, Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624, 625 (1963); Voren-
berg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1523-24 (1981).
'59 DAVIS, note 2 supra, at 4. See DESMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE Ac-
TION 278 (4th ed. 1980) ("The legal concept of discretion implies power to make a choice
between alternative courses of action"); JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 359 (1965) ("We may... define discretion as a power to make a choice within a class
of actions"); HART & SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 162 (1958) (unpublished manuscript)
("discretion means the power to choose between two or more courses of action each of which
is thought of as permissible"); Wexler, Discretion: The Unacknowledged Side of the Law, 25
TORONTO L.J. 120, 123 n.8 (1975).
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federal courts should pay to the informed discretion" of public
officials, 6 ' it has in mind the notion that officials have a certain
freedom of choice that must be respected. This same freedom of
choice is undoubtedly what the Court meant to preserve with its
concept of "discretion" in Rhinehart.
The difficulty with viewing discretion in this manner is that it
reinforces the notion that law and discretion are mutually exclu-
sive. Law, after all, "imposes an environment of constraint, of tests
to be met, standards to be observed, ideals to be fulfilled."' 61 And if
discretion is viewed as choice, it is all too easy to begin to think of it
as that "residue" of pure free choice which remains after all forms of
legal control are eliminated.' 62 This way of thinking can lead di-
rectly to the image of discretion as "the hole in the doughnut,...
an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction. ' 163 The area
of discretion expands or contracts, as surrounding legal restrictions
grow or diminish; but by definition discretion (choice) and law
(restraint) cannot occupy the same space at the same time. It is this
image that appears to underlie the Court's opinion in Rhinehart.
It is a misleading image, however, for it focuses attention on the
presence or absence of discretion, rather than on the intricate ways
in which discretion and law interact in the process of decision
making. It invites us to conceptualize choice as a single, unitary act
that is either free or constrained, rather than as a complex process.
Our judicial system contains numerous examples of decision mak-
ing that is both discretionary and guided by legal standards. But
since we have no disciplined method to bring these examples easily
to mind, we do not use them in analysis of unfamiliar circum-
stances, such as Rhinehart.
These examples suggest that trial court discretion to manage
pretrial discovery can be analyzed in at least three distinct dimen-
sions. Trial courts can have discretion with respect to controlling
160 Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977). See, e.g., Block v.
Rutherford, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3235 (1984); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446
U.S. 1, 10 (1980); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 n.28 (1979); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 688 (1979).
'6' SELzNICK, note 113 supra, at 11.
162 See STINON, SMITHBURG, & THOMPSON, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 514 (1950); cf.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1697
(1975).
161 DWORKIN, note 1 supra, at 31.
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legal standards, with respect to the reviewing power of appellate
courts, and with respect to structural characteristics of their deci-
sion-making process, such as the obligation to articulate reasons for
their decisions. Trial court discretion can exist in various degrees in
each of these dimensions, and it can exist in some dimensions and
not in others.
A. DISCRETION AND APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
The common law traditionally distinguished between "the in-
certain and crooked cord of discretion" and "the golden and
straight mete-wand of the law."164 Accustomed to view the law as a
system of general rules imposing "restraint and regulation" on judi-
cial decision,' 65 the common law distrusted judicial discretion, 166
since a discretionary decision was one in which there were "no fixed
principles by which its correctness may be determined.' ' 167 The
classic statement, often repeated in nineteenth-century American
cases, is by Lord Camden, who said that "[t]he discretion of a judge
is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is different in differ-
ent men; it is casual and depends upon constitution, temper, and
passion."1 68 American judges embroidered the theme. A justice of
the Alabama Supreme Court, for example, inveighed against "the
uncertainty of a power, so uncontrollable and liable to error as mere
judicial discretion-a power that may possibly be misdirected by a
fit of temporary sickness, an extra mint julep, or the smell of a
peculiar overcoat. 169
The primary means by which nineteenth-century American
courts reconciled themselves to judicial discretion was to view it, in
the manner of Chief Justice Marshall, as a term of art. "Courts are
164 See Smith, note 69snpra, at 30; Conway v. The Queen, I Cox C.C. 210, 216 (1845).
161 Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice, 35 F.R.D.
273, 275-76, 278 (1964) (originally published at 29 A.B.A. REP. (1906)).
166 Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case,
35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 925, 926-28 (1960).
167 Palliser v. Home Telephone, 170 Ala. 341, 54 S. 499, 500 (1911).
168 Doe v. Kersey (1765) (C.P.) (Unreported), quoted in FEARNE, CONTINGENT REIAIN-
DERS AND EXECUTORY DEVISES 535 n.(t) (3d Am. ed. 1826). See State v. Cummings, 36 Mo.
263, 279 (1965), rev'd, 71 U.S. 277 (1866). Hence the proverb: "That system of law is best
which confides as little as possible to the discretion of the judge; that judge is best who trusts
as little as possible to himself." OSBORN, A CONCISE LAW DICTIONARY 198 (1927).
169 Ex parte Chase, 43 Ala. 303, 311 (1869).
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the mere instruments of the law," he said, "and can will noth-
ing."1 70
When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal
discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course
prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of
the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the
purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the
purpose of giving effect ... to the will of the law.
While this perception could be readily assimilated to a traditional
view of law as a system of restraints, it also seemed to deny the very
existence of judicial discretion. Frustration with this apparent para-
dox led one nineteenth-century jurist to exclaim that "when applied
to public functionaries" the term discretion means 171
a power or right conferred upon them by law, of acting officially
in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own
judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or con-
science of others. But what is to be understood by a discretion
that is governed by fixed legal principles is, I must be allowed to
say, something that I have not found satisfactorily explained,
and what it is not easy for me to comprehend, Poetry may be
indulged the license of saying,
We have a power in ourselves to do it, but it is
A power which we have no power to do.
The paradox that so troubled the jurist is to modern eyes easily
resolved once it is understood that the attribution of discretion can
be relative. From the viewpoint of an appellate court, for example,
a trial judge may have discretion with respect to the determination
of a defendant's sentence, since the judge can (within limits) choose
the standards that will guide the sentencing process, and the appel-
late court will not interfere. '72 With respect to the appellate court,
the sentencing judge is not bound by enforceable legal rules, and
can act according to the dictates of judgment and conscience.
From the viewpoint of the sentencing judge, however, there is
nevertheless an official decision to be made according to legal crite-
17' Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 326, 381 (1924). See, e.g.,
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931); Lent v. Tillson, 140 U.S. 316, 329 (1891);
Tingley v. Dolby, 13 Neb. 371, 14 N.W. 146, 147-48 (1882); Scott v. Marley, 124 Tenn.
388, 1317 S.W. 492, 493 (1911).
171 Judges v. People, 18 Wend. 79, 99 (1837).
172 United States v. Mejias, 552 F.2d 435, 447 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977).
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ria. The sentencing judge does not perceive himself as free to act on
purely personal motives or private desires. He cannot decide the
proper sentence by flipping a coin. He might instead feel himself
bound to choose the appropriate legal policies-whether they be
deterrence, punishment, or rehabilitation-and to do his best to
implement them. He can be, from his own perspective, an "instru-
ment of the law."
It is rather common for trial court decisions to be governed by
legal standards, even though the decisions are "discretionary" from
the point of view of an appellate court. This is typical of the struc-
ture of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 26(b), for ex-
ample, provides that the decision with respect to permissive inter-
vention should lie within the "discretion" of the trial court,
meaning that the decision "is not reviewable by an appellate court
unless clear abuse is shown." '17 3 Yet the Rule also states explicit
criteria to guide the trial judge's decision even in the absence of
appellate review. 174 From the point of view of the trial judge, then,
the decision whether to permit intervention is governed by au-
thoritative legal standards. This combination of discretion and con-
straint characterizes the Court's treatment of discretion in a variety
of areas. The decision whether to dismiss an action for forum non
conveniens, for example, "is committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court" and "may be reversed only when there has been a clear
abuse of discretion."175 Yet the Court has promulgated a list of no
less than twelve "factors" to be evaluated by the trial court in the
exercise of its discretion. 176
There can, of course, be situations in which a trial court is, from
its own perspective, free from guiding legal standards. An example
offered by an early writer is a judge's control of the court calendar.
In the decision to fix "a day for appearance," the judge is not bound
to act "according to his ideas of right," but rather may act "as he
pleases. 17 7 In such circumstances, we might say, there is no law to
'7' Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 142 (1944).
174 Rule 24(b) states: "In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties."
,' Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
176 Id. at 241 n.6.
117 Kaufman, Judicial Discretion, 17 Am. L. REv. 567, 567 (1883).
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guide the judge's decision. The question whether a decision is dis-
cretionary from the point of view of a trial court, therefore, de-
pends upon the presence or absence of legal standards. It is fair to
say, however, that such discretion is rare: as Justice Frankfurter
once observed, "Discretion without a criterion for its exercise is
authorization of arbitrariness." 78
The concept of point of view thus illustrates the distinction be-
tween trial court discretion resulting from the absence of appellate
review, and trial court discretion resulting from the absence of
applicable legal standards. The two forms of discretion are related
in a complicated manner: A trial court decision can be bound by
legal rules and yet be immune from appellate supervision. But a
decision that is truly unguided by legal standards will necessarily
be discretionary from the point of view of an appellate court. 179
The Court in Rhinehart, because of its implicit assumption that
discretion was simply the power to choose, overlooked the distinc-
tion between these forms of discretion. The Court clearly held that
the First Amendment does not prohibit appellate courts from view-
ing the decision to issue a restraining order as discretionary. 18 0 But
the Court did not address the question whether such a decision is
discretionary from the point of view of the trial court itself. Need
the trial court consider constitutional standards when deciding
whether to issue a restraining order, or are such standards irrele-
vant to its decision? The Supreme Court did not tell us. It did not
even raise the issue.
The omission cannot be justified. Once the Court acknowledged
that litigants retain some First Amendment interests in the dissemi-
nation of discovery information, it incurred a concomitant respon-
sibility to articulate controlling constitutional principles for defin-
ing and protecting those interests. Since the requirements of the
Constitution do not emanate solely from the commands of appel-
late courts, these principles would constrain trial court decisions
even in the absence of appellate review.
It does not follow that such constitutional principles will neces-
sarily convert trial courts into "instruments of the law" that are,
178 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433, 496 (1953) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
179 See Friendly, Indiscretion about Discretion, 31 E.\tORY L.J. 747, 765 (1982).
"'o The Court approved an "abuse of discretion" standard of appellate review. 104 S.Ct. at
2209.
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from their own perspective, without discretion. This is because the
kind of trial court discretion that stems from applicable legal stan-
dards is a gradient which can exist in varying degrees. This can be
seen if one imagines legal standards as arranged along a spec-
trum. 1 8  At one end are standards that give no guidance to a deci-
sion maker. An example would be a statute authorizing a policeman
to regulate traffic "as he thinks fit.' 82 Such a statute would deprive
the policeman of any law to apply and would create a situation in
which his decisions were, from his own point of view, discretion-
ary. At the other end of the spectrum are standards that function as
specific rules, mechanically requiring a decision maker to reach one
result or the other. An example would be a statute authorizing a
policeman to regulate an intersection by requiring traffic to move
for two minutes in one direction, and three minutes in the other.
Such a statute would leave virtually no room for the exercise of
discretion. A policeman following its instructions would properly
view himself as a mere "instrument of the law."
The vast majority of legal standards will fall in the middle range
of the spectrum, and will neither completely cede nor completely
withhold discretion. These standards will have an open texture
requiring the exercise of independent judgment for their implemen-
tation. An example would be a statute authorizing a policeman to
regulate traffic "to avoid undue congestion." When the Court in
Rhinehart concluded that Rule 26(c) gave trial courts room for the
exercise of "broad discretion," it meant this sense of discretion
informed by legal standards. Ronald Dworkin calls this " 'discre-
tion' in a weak sense," and observes that it exists whenever "for
some reason the standards an official must apply cannot be applied
mechanically but demand the use of judgment. "183
"Weak" discretion exists in varying degrees. Different First
Amendment standards will thus cede more or less weak discretion
to trial courts in the issuance of restraining orders. A First Amend-
ment standard could consist of specific and mechanical rules stating
when restraining orders would constitutionally be deemed as neces-
181 See Gifford, Discretionary Decisionmaking in the Regulatory Agencies: A Conceptual Frame-
work, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 101, 102 (1983).
182 These examples are suggested by Jowell, The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion,
1973 PUB. LAW 178, 179-80.
183 DWORKIN, note 1 supra, at 31.
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sary for effective management of pretrial discovery. Or a First
Amendment standard could consist of a more general statement of
constitutional objectives, such as that restraining orders should not
unnecessarily interfere with litigants' First Amendment rights. An
important factor in the selection .of an appropriate First Amend-
ment standard should be the extent of weak discretion necessary to
assure effective management of pretrial discovery.
B. DISCRETION AND APPELLATE CONTROL
It is often difficult to distinguish trial court discretion arising
from the absence of appellate control from the kind of weak discre-
tion entailed by the open texture of a legal standard. Commentators
sometimes assume that as weak discretion increases, the possibility
of effective appellate control correspondingly diminishes.184 The
assumption is inaccurate. The exercise of appellate control is inde-
pendent of the specificity or generality of the law to be applied.
Appellate courts can exercise strict control of trial court decision
making even when applying general standards, and, conversely,
there are situations (although rare) when appellate courts give only
cursory review to judgments controlled by the most specific and
mechanical of legal rules.' 85
Like weak discretion, trial court discretion arising from the ab-
sence of appellate review is a gradient that exists in varying degrees.
The stricter the form of appellate review, the less discretion a trial
court can be said to have. For our purposes, three forms of appel-
late control should be distinguished, which I shall call (1) indepen-
dent review, (2) deference, and (3) delegation.
The "rule of independent review," which was strongly reaf-
firmed this Term, holds that it is the "constitutional responsibility"
of an appellate court independently to examine the record in cases
in which First Amendment rights are denied.' 86 Appellate courts
applying the rule essentially view trial court determinations of First
Amendment rights as questions of law, to be independently rede-
cided by the appellate court after full scrutiny of the record. The
184 See, e.g., Friendly, note 179 supra, at 760-61; Rosenberg, note 158 supra, at 663.
1"5 For example, appellate courts commonly both accord the decisions of juries great
deference and ask them to make those decisions pursuant to strict and rigorous rules of law.
186 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1959 (1984).
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underlying assumption is that application of appropriate First
Amendment standards will yield a single correct legal conclusion,
which the trial court either did or did not reach. This is true even
when applicable First Amendment standards are quite general and
leave considerable room for the exercise of judgment on the part of
the trial court. 187 In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, for ex-
ample, the Court held that First Amendment standards governing
the closure of criminal trials entail a complex evaluation of numer-
ous "factors," and that these standards require the exercise of "dis-
cretion" by the trial court. 188 Yet the Court independently reviews
decisions to close criminal trials to determine if trial judges have in
fact used their judgment to come to the "right" constitutional con-
clusion.189 The rule of independent review thus gives appellate
courts license to second guess the "weak discretion" that derives
from the open-textured quality of certain constitutional stan-
dards.190 .
The rule of independent review prohibits appellate courts from
viewing trial court decisions as discretionary. In Rhinehart the
Court explicitly rejected independent review, stating that "[i]t is
sufficient for purposes of our decision that the highest court in the
state found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to
issue a protective order pursuant to a constitutional state law." 19' A
fair interpretation of this passage would be that although the First
Amendment does not require appellate courts to exercise the rule of
independent review, it does require, at a minimum, that appellate
courts reviewing decisions to issue restraining orders employ an
"abuse-of-discretion" standard.
When an appellate court reviews a trial court decision for abuse
of discretion, it usually begins with a ritual incantation: "The ques-
tion, of course, is not whether this Court, or whether the Court of
Appeals, would as an original matter have [done X]; it is whether
187 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1692 n. 10(1983); Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
457 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1982).
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S.Ct. 819, 824 (1984); Richmond
Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
190 For a discussion of the intricate relationship between the rule of independent review
and appellate court deference to trial court findings of fact, see Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958-60 (1984).
191 104 S.Ct. at 2209.
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the District Court dbused its discretion in so doing." '192 The incan-
tation is meant to signify that review for abuse of discretion, unlike
the rule of independent review, is designed to insulate a trial court's
exercise of judgment from second-guessing by an appellate court. 193
Appellate courts employ the abuse-of-discretion standard when
they believe that the question before the trial court is susceptible of
different satisfactory resolutions.
The abuse-of-discretion standard is commonly perceived to be
incoherent. A noted commentator has suggested that "[t]he phrase
'abuse of discretion' does not communicate meaning. It is a form of
ill-tempered appellate grunting and should be dispensed with."' 94
One reason the standard is confused is that it encompasses two
distinct situations that are almost never distinguished. In the first,
which I shall call "deference," appellate courts retain control over
the governing legal standard, but defer to trial court judgments in
the implementation of that standard. In the second, which I shall
call "delegation," appellate courts delegate to trial courts the power
to determine the legal standards by which the correctness of their
decisions will be judged.
If the standard of law to be applied has a sufficiently open tex-
ture, trial courts will have great latitude in choosing among alterna-
tive courses of action in situations of both deference and delega-
tion.' For this reason those who view discretion as the power to
choose often conflate the two situations. Consider, for example, the
comments of Judge Henry Friendly, in the context of a case con-
cerning a trial court's discretionary power to dismiss a complaint
without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2): 19 6
[T]he fact that dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) usually rests on the
judge's discretion does not mean that this is always so. Several of
the most important reasons for deferring to the trial judge's dis-
192 Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 707 (1982).
193 This concept is often expressed by the formulation that "A review of a trial court's
action in the exercise of discretion does not depend upon whether we would have reached the
same conclusion, but rather upon whether, as a matter of law, there was an abuse of
discretion." Rogers v. Lyle Adjustment Co., 70 N.M. 209, 372 P.2d 797, 800 (1962). See
MeManus v. Larson, 122 Cal. App. 716, 10 P.2d 523, 525 (1923).
194 Rosenberg, note 158 supra, at 659; see Friendly, note 179 supra, at 763-64.
1i See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980);
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510 & n.28 (1978).
19 Noonan v. Cunard Steamship Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1967).
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cretion-his observation of the witnesses, his superior opportu-
nity to get 'the feel of the case,' . . . and the impracticability of
framing a rule of decision where many disparate factors must be
weighed-.. . are inapposite when a question arising in advance
of trial can be stated in a form susceptible of a yes-or-no answer
applicable to all cases.
Judge Friendly's underlying conception of discretion is that of
choice. He speaks, for example, of "deferring to the trial judge's
discretion." But this conception leads him to run together situations
in which trial courts are given the power to choose because appel-
late courts cannot formulate "a rule of decision," with those situa-
tions in which trial courts are given the power to choose because of
their superior access to pertinent facts such as "the feel of the
case." '197 Judge Friendly overlooks the distinction between delega-
tion and deference because each creates large areas free from the
"surrounding belt of restriction," and he is primarily interested in
the sweep, rather than the quality, of a trial court's freedom of
choice.
Appellate court review in a situation of deference entails a ten-
sion between the articulation of a controlling legal standard and the
preservation of a trial court's freedom of choice in the implementa-
tion of the standard. Appellate courts traditionally maintain this
tension by enunciating a general legal "objective," such as the "in-
terest in sound judicial administration," and then narrating the
various factors that must be considered in attaining the objective.' 98
Irrespective of the outcome of a particular decision, appellate courts
can then exercise review to determine if a trial court has in fact
considered all the appropriate factors,1 99 or if it has considered cer-
tain inappropriate factors,200 or if it has failed to give certain factors
appropriate weight.20 This kind of appellate control is precluded in
197 Deference and delegation are similarly conflated in Friendly, note 179 supra, at 759-62,
and in Rosenberg, note 158 supra, at 662-65.
1'9 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980).
'99 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 482 F.2d 632, 643-44 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wiggins v.
United States, 386 A.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. 1978); In re Adoption of Driscoll, 269 Cal. App.
2d 735, 75 Cal. Rptr. 382, 384 (1969).
" See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510 n.28 (1978); United States v.
Capriola, 537 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1978); D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe,
459 F.2d 1231, 1245-48 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); United States v.
Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 490 (2d Cir. 1950).
21l Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 103 S.Ct. 927,
938-39 (1983); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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situations of delegation, since trial courts are then authorized to
determine which factors are legally pertinent for their decisions.
20 2
Trial court discretion vis-a-vis appellate review is at its maximum
in situations of delegation.
Although the Court in Rhinebart strongly implied that appellate
courts reviewing decisions to issue restraining orders are constitu-
tionally obligated to use an abuse-of-discretion standard, it did not
address the question whether such review should involve deference
or delegation. As a matter of state law, the Supreme Court of
Washington appeared to address the question as one involving def-
erence:
20 3
Our understanding of the rule, contrary to that of the federal
circuit courts in In re Halkin and In re San Juan Star Co., is that
'good cause' is established if the moving party shows that any of
the harms spoken of in the rule is threatened and can be avoided
without impeding the discovery process. In determining
whether a protective order is needed and appropriate, the court
properly weighs the respective interests of the parties. The
judge's major concern should be the facilitation of the discovery
process and the protection of the integrity of that process, which
necessarily involves consideration of the privacy interest of the
parties and, in the ordinary case at least, does not require or
condone publicity.
The passage is ambiguous, since it requires trial courts to weigh
"the respective interests of the parties," and yet it never explains
what should count as a cognizable interest of the party receiving the
discovery information. Although this might be taken as ceding au-
thority to trial courts to develop standards concerning the interests
of parties receiving information, the overall thrust of the passage
(and the opinion) is clearly that decisions to issue restraining orders
should be guided by a "major concern" to facilitate the discovery
process and to protect its integrity. Thus the Washington court
seems to have conceptualized the situation as one of deference.
The Supreme Court, like the Washington court, understood
discretion to be primarily a matter of trial court flexibility and
choice, and thus did not distinguish among grades of appellate
control. The Court did assert, however, that trial court "discretion"
202 See, e.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wange, 450 U.S. 139, 144-45 (1981).
203 654 P.2d at 690. The Court reviewed the issuance of the restraining order under an
abuse of discretion standard.
217
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is justified because the "trial court is in the best position to weigh
fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by dis-
covery," 2°4 and the Court did not enunciate any factors to be
weighed in that balance. Since the Court also concluded that liti-
gants retain First Amendment interests in the dissemination of
discovery information, it is fair to surmise that the Court consid-
ered these interests to be so vague or diffuse as to be articulable
only through the case-by-case determinations of the trial court. It
would seem, therefore, that a state appellate court reviewing the
issuance of a restraining order pursuant to Rule 26(c) would treat
issues of state law as a matter of deference, but issues of federal
constitutional law as a matter of delegation. The Supreme Court
did not explain why these two kinds of issues should be treated dif-
ferently.
C. THE STRUCTURE OF DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS
Because the abuse-of-discretion standard is indiscriminately ap-
plied in situations of both deference and delegation, it is forced to
serve somewhat inconsistent functions. In situations primarily in-
volving delegation, the abuse-of-discretion standard is construed to
permit review only on the basis of a dilute and generous principle of
background rationality, assumed to apply to all decision makers in
all circumstances."' 5 In this modality, appellate courts characteris-
tically say that "an abuse of discretion exists only when no rea-
sonable person would take the position adopted by the trial
court." ' 6 Appellate courts sometimes add to the criterion of ratio-
nality the requirement that trial court decisions not be "the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will."20 7 Appellate courts also use
204 104 S.Ct. at 2209.
205 See Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Arant, 171 S.W.2d 915, 919 n.1 (Tex. Civ. App.
1943).
206 Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 576, 599 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1979). See,
e.g., Lemons v. St. John's Hospital, 5 Kan. App. 2d 161, 613 P.2d 957, 960 (1980) ("If
reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it
cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion"); Moser v. Wilhelm, 300 N.W.2d
840, 847 (N. Dak. 1981) ("An abuse of discretion is defined as an unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable attitude on the part of the trial court").
207 Mielcuszny v. Rosol, 317 Pa. 91, 176 A. 236, 237 (1934). See, e.g., Tobeluk v. Lind,
589 P.2d 873, 878 (Ala. 1979) ("We will not interfere with the trial court's determination
unless it is shown that the court abused its discretion by issuing a decision which is arbitrary,
capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or which stems from an improper motive").
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the abuse-of-discretion standard to ensure that trial courts under-
stand that they have the power to exercise discretion, since
"[flailure to exercise choice in a situation calling for choice is an
abuse of discretion."208
In situations primarily involving deference, the abuse of discre-
tion standard is used by appellate courts to fulfill the very different
function of enforcing applicable legal standards. Thus appellate
courts will find an "abuse of discretion" if a trial court, in reaching
its decision, entertained inappropriate considerations,20 9 or if it
failed to entertain certain appropriate considerations,210 or if it did
not appropriately weigh the factors it did consider."'
The abuse-of-discretion standard of review is thus used to pre-
serve trial court flexibility and choice, and at the same time to
screen trial court decisions for rationality, for improper motive or
prejudice, and for compliance with pertinent legal principles. In
order to perform these different functions; the abuse-of-discretion
standard has been associated with a variety of devices designed to
ensure that trial court decisions can be properly reviewed. These
devices have been used in circumstances of both delegation and
deference, although they appear to be more appropriately neces-
sary in the latter situation.
Although an appellate court can review trial court decisions for
abuse of discretion without requiring a record, findings, or any
articulation of reasons, review in such circumstances can only be
cursory.212 If an appellate court wishes to assure itself that a trial
court has exercised its discretion, or has made a reasonable deci-
sion, or has followed controlling principles of law, the appellate
court can prescribe that discretionary decision making be accom-
... Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 363 (D.C. 1979). See Seibert v. Minneapolis
& St. Louis Ry. Co., 58 Minn. 58, 57 N.W. 1068, 1070 (1894); Grow v. Wolcott, 123 Vt.
490, 194 A.2d 403, 404 (1963); BOWERS, note 144 supra, at 37-49; cf. Accardi v. Shaugh-
nessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267-68 (1954).
" City of Elkhart v. Middleton, 265 Ind. 514, 356 N.E.2d 207, 211 (1976).
230 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358-64 (1978).
211 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). In situations of deference, appellate
courts will characteristically defer to trial court judgments in the implementation of legal
standards so long as these judgments are not "clearly unreasonable." Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10 (1980).
212 See Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Woodruffv. Woodruff, 7 Ohio
Misc. 87, 217 N.E.2d 264, 268 (1965).
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panied by procedures to enhance reviewability. Appellate courts
can require that there be a "rational basis in the evidence" to sup-
port a trial court's discretionary decision;213 or they can compel a
trial court to "disclose, by specific findings, the basis for its ultimate
conclusion";214 or they can mandate "that the exercise of discretion
be accompanied by the trial court's articulation of the factors con-
sidered and the weight accorded to them. 21 5
By combining these various devices, and by enforcing them,
appellate courts can give teeth to the abuse-of-discretion standard
of review. While such rigor is ordinarily associated with judicial
review of administrative discretion,216 it has also been applied to
appellate review of judicial discretion in the pretrial management of
a case. In Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard,217 for example, the Supreme
Court used the abuse-of-discretion standard to review the issuance
of a restraining order that essentially prohibited named plaintiffs
and their counsel from communicating with any actual or potential
plaintiff class members. 218 The Court did not reach the question of
the order's constitutionality, 2 9 but instead held that the trial court
had "abused its discretion" because it had issued the order without
"a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the
213 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 669
F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1982). See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S.
1, 10 (1980).
214 Grow v. Wolcott, 123 Vt. 490, 194 A.2d 403, 407 (1963).
211 United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981). See Hartung v. Hartung,
102 Wis. 2d 58, 306 N.W.2d 16, 21 (1981); City of Elkhart v. Middleton, 265 Ind. 514, 356
N.E.2d 207, 210 (1976). Judge Friendly has strongly argued that in situations of deference
trial courts should be required to make explicit the grounds of their "discretionary" decisions:
"Once it has been deemed appropriate to limit the range of discretion, whether through
announcement of a principle of preference or the specification of factors, it becomes neces-
sary that the trial court articulate the basis for its decision. Otherwise it will not be possible
for an appellate court to determine whether the trial court's decision rest on an application of
the proper rule or the mistaken assumption of some other rule." Friendly, note 179 supra, at
770.
216 See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-68 (1962);
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut., 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866-67 (1983).
217 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
... The restraining order was issued pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d), which authorizes
judicial management of class actions.
219 452 U.S. at 101 n. 15. The Court stated: "[A]Ithough we do not decide what standards
are mandated by the First Amendment in this kind of case, we do observe that the order
involved serious restraints on expression. This fact, at minimum, counsels caution on the
part of a district court in drafting such an order, and attention to whether the restraint is
justified by a likelihood of serious abuses." Id. at 103-04.
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need for limitation and the potential interference with the rights of
the parties." 220
The Court offered three reasons to justify the imposition of these
requirements. First, the requirements would help create a "record
useful for appellate review." 221 Second, they were necessary to
"ensure that the court is furthering, rather thah hindering, the
policies embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 222
Third, and most interesting, the requirements would force the trial
court to engage in a process of balancing in the course of which it
would have explicitly to identify "the potential abuses being ad-
dressed." 22 3 In this manner the process of trial court choice could be
structured so as to increase the likelihood that it would "result in a
carefully drawn order that limits speech as little as possible, consis-
tent with the rights of the parties under the circumstances. 2 24
Bernard thus suggests that certain structural prerequisites can be
imposed on discretionary decision making both to enhance the
quality of decision making and to increase the chances of meaning-
ful appellate review. I shall call these prerequisites "accountability
requirements." Accountability requirements may have value even
if trial court decisions entail the exercise of weak discretion and are
discretionary from the point of view of appellate review.
The Court in Rbinebart did not explicitly address the issue of
accountability requirements. It did not explain whether trial courts
issuing restraining orders would be constitutionally required to
compile a record, issue findings, or articulate "the need for a limita-
tion and the potential interference with the rights of the parties. 225
It is thus open to question whether the First Amendment compels
these accountability requirements to "ensure that the [trial] court is
furthering, rather than hindering," its policies.
220 Id. at 101.
221 Id. at 102.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 Id. at 102. SeeJohnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 364 (D.C. 1979): "In both the
judicial and administrative spheres the requirement that the decision-maker compile a record
Inakes certain that the facts of the case do not escape his attention and makes it more probable
that the decision-maker will exercise his discretion in a proper manner." See also DAVIS, note
2 supra, at 97-141.
225 The facts of Rbinebart are ambiguous. Although the trial judge made no specific
findings, he did issue an opinion justifying entry of the restraining order. And the record in
the case clearly provides a rational basis for the decision to issue the order.
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V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DISCRETION, AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
If restraining orders can appropriately be characterized as an
internal management tool of the judicial system, they will be con-
stitutional if necessary for achievement of the system's legitimate
ends. This is true even though restraining orders constitute prior
restraints and depend on the content of litigants' speech. The ques-
tion remains, however, whether any particular restraining order is
necessary for the supervision of pretrial discovery. The implicit
position of Rule 26(c) is that effective administration of pretrial
discovery requires that the answer to this question be committed to
the discretion of trial judges. In Rhinehart the Supreme Court af-
firmed this position.
But this position is far too coarse to serve as a basis for constitu-
tional analysis, both because it fails to distinguish among the vari-
ous dimensions of discretion, and because it fails to appreciate that
discretion is a matter of degree. More careful analysis would re-
quire an inquiry into the nature and extent of trial court discretion
claimed to be necessary for effective pretrial administration.
A. RESTRAINING ORDERS AND "WEAK" DISCRETION
"Weak" discretion exists when a controlling legal standard is so
open textured or general that its implementation requires the exer-
cise of judgment. The First Amendment ordinarily limits weak
discretion by requiring that legal standards authorizing the sup-
pression of speech "set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforce-
ment officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 'arbitrary and
discriminatory' enforcement." '226 But some weak discretion is both
unavoidable and constitutionally permissible. In Feiner v. New
York, for example, the Court upheld the exercise of a "police
officer's proper discretionary power" to suppress speech on the
227basis of a constitutional breach-of-the-peace statute. At some
226 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974).
227 340 U.S. 314, 319 (1951). Similarly, the Court has held that statutes governing deci-
sions to issue parade or demonstration permits can be general enough to leave room for the
"discretion" of a decision maker, so long as that discretion is limited to appropriate considera-
tions of "time, place and manner." Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941).
See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965).
[1984
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point, however, controlling legal standards become so general as to
leave "unfettered discretion"22 in the hands of government offi-
cials, and this is constitutionally impermissible since speech might
then be penalized on the basis of "personal predilections. '"229
There is no sharp line at which weak discretion passes into con-
stitutionally forbidden license. 23 ° In the regulation of the speech of
the general public, the Court's analysis of weak discretion can most
kindly be described as confused. In the regulation of insubordinate
speech, however, the distinction between permissible and imper-
missible weak discretion is tied to a functional analysis of the in-
stitutional authority in question. Weak discretion is constitutional
when it is "necessary to the furtherance" of institutional goals.231
As the Court said in a case challenging military regulation of speech
as delegating excessive weak discretion: "For the reasons which
differentiate military society from civilian society, we think Con-
gress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth and with
greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by which the former
shall be governed than it is when prescribing rules for the latter.,
23 2
Management situations characteristically involve weak discre-
tion. This is because strict rules that leave no room for judgment in
their implementation are unsuitable "where the action to be con-
trolled is non-recurring" and in circumstances involving "per-
sonalized, individual application." '233 When rules are strictly ap-
plied in such situations, they can create an "unreasonableness,
234
that is fierce, unproductive, and "bureaupathic. ' '235 Morris Cohen
long ago captured the dilemma "felt by every one who has to give
orders to a human subordinate. You attempt to guard yourself
228 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168 (1972).
29 Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858-59 (1983).
230 See Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vaguenes" Doctrine in tbe Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67, 94-96 (1960). In part the placement of this line depends upon whether, "by the
nature of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot establish standards with great
precision." Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 581.
231 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 416-18 (1974).
232 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974).
233 Jowell, note 182 supra, at 202. See PERROW, note 127 supra, at 162-63. Most manage-
ment situations involve precisely such nonrecurring circumstances demanding the exercise of
personal judgment. See KoTTER, THE GENERAL MANAGERS 122-24 (1982).
234 BARDACH & KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UN-
REASONABLENESS 58-119 (1982).
23 THOMPSON, MODERN ORGANIZATION 94 (1977).
223
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against his mistakes or departures from your settled policy by lay-
ing down fixed rules. But when your subordinate rigorously fol-
lows these rules, you are vexed that he does so mechanically with-
out using common sense or judgment." '236
Most organizations want their managers to use their common
sense and consequently prescribe fixed rules sparingly, tending
instead to control their managers by setting general objectives or
goals which the managers are expected to meet.237 The more man-
agerial performance is defined by its product or outcome, "the more
discretion" is given the manager "to supply the means-ends connec-
tions. 23
8
These considerations apply to judicial management of pretrial
discovery. Pretrial discovery involves nonrecurring situations filled
with "multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist
generalization.' 239 It involves the continual exercise of judgment,24 °
the continual assessment of the intentions, goals, and good faith of
litigants;2 1 and it is for these reasons "not amenable to regulation
by rule. ' 24 2 As a consequence both the Washington and the Federal
rules of civil procedure do not prescribe detailed and mechanical
rules to govern the management of pretrial discovery, and instead
provide trial judges with the power and flexibility necessary to
attain broadly stated institutional goals.243
To impose strict rules on the issuance of restraining orders would
impose deep costs of unreasonableness and managerial inefficiency.
The circumstances requiring issuance of such orders are simply too
236 COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 262 (1982).
237 See, e.g., DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES 430-42
(1973); GALBRAITH, ORGANIZATION DESIGN 45-46 (1977); ODIORNE, MANAGE.MIENT DECI-
SIONS BY OBJECTIVES (1969).
238 MARCH & SIMON, note 128 supra, at 147.
239 Rosenberg, note 158 supra, at 662.
24 See text at notes 114-17 supra.
241 See, e.g., Resnik, note 111 supra, at 393.
242 Rosenberg, note 158 supra, at 662. William Glaser, in his study of pretrial discovery,
concluded: "Rules cannot anticipate every situation and supply detailed guidelines; the rules
must have administrators who distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate complaint and
who can manage each situation." GLASER, note 116 supra, at 237.
243 The Supreme Court of Washington stated that "the purpose of the discovery rule [is] to
encourage full disclosure of all relevant facts so as to facilitate the administration of justice,
acquaint the examiner with the testimony that will be given at trial, develop the truth,
shorten and simplify the trial, eliminate elements of surprise, and permit the parties to
prepare for trial." 654 P.2d at 678-79.
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multifarious to be encompassed by any set of specific rules. The
issue is not simply that a regime of strict, mechanical rules would
impair the ability of trial courts to issue restraining orders when
appropriate, but also that this impairment would adversely affect
the capacity of trial judges to manage other aspects of pretrial dis-
covery. Trial judges presently have broad discretion to control the
exchange of discovery information so as to attain the general goals
of pretrial discovery. But to the extent that strict rules are imposed
on restraining orders, discretion to manage the exchange of infor-
mation will also be constricted. Even if judges believe that perti-
nent discovery information should be produced, they may be un-
willing to require its production if the presence of inflexible rules
disables them from ensuring that such information will be properly
used.
Even the Halkin opinion does not attempt to impose a regime of
strict rules on the issuance of restraining orders, but rather pro-
poses a series of general First Amendment principles meant to
inform the judgment of trial judges."4 The trial judge is instructed
to consider factors like the nature of the First Amendment interests
at stake and the extent of the harm to be averted.245 It is perfectly
proper to conceive First Amendment principles as ceding such
weak discretion to trial judges. The Supreme Court has even held
that with regard to the administrative decision to close a criminal
trial, the First Amendment requires that trial judges exercise weak
"discretion" so that their judgment may most accurately reflect the
particular circumstances involved.246
Two consequences follow from this reasoning. First, the Court's
conclusion in Rhinehart that the First Amendment does not prohibit
Rule 26(c)'s delegation of "broad discretion" seems essentially cor-
rect. Although Rule 26(c) makes no effort to specify "narrow, ob-
jective and definite standards '247 to govern the issuance of re-
straining orders, any attempt to do so would likely cripple trial
courts' ability effectively to manage the pretrial exchange of discov-
ery information. Second, the First Amendment standard governing
244 See Brink v. DaLesio, 82 F.R.D. 664, 678 (D. Md. 1979).
245 598 F.2d at 191. The court stressed that these considerations must be evaluated in the
context of "particular discovery material and a particular trial setting." Id. at 195.
24 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608-10 (1982).
247 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969).
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the issuance of restraining orders should not itself contain specific
standards. It would have been sufficient for the Court to have made
clear that restraining orders seriously infringe litigants' First
Amendment interests, and that this infringement should not take
place unless necessary to attain the goals of pretrial discovery.
B. RESTRAINING ORDERS AND APPELLATE CONTROL
The issue that most sharply divides Halkin and Rbinebart is the
degree of appellate control that should be exercised over decisions
to issue restraining orders. 48 Halkin holds that appellate courts
should apply the rule of independent review to such decisions;
Rbinebart decides that appellate courts can view such decisions as
involving a situation of delegation.
The Supreme Court's decision is plainly incorrect. Appellate
courts normally treat trial court management of pretrial discovery
as a question of deference, and indeed the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington has indicated that decisions to issue restraining orders under
Rule 26(c) should be so viewed as a matter of state law.24 9 Since
there is an articulable First Amendment standard that should gov-
ern decisions to issue restraining orders, there is no justification for
the Supreme Court's view that appellate courts treat such decisions
as raising issues of delegation rather than of deference. The most
that can reasonably be maintained is that appellate courts should
retain control over the articulation of the applicable First Amend-
ment standard, but should defer to trial courts in its implementa-
tion. The question is thus whether appellate courts should apply
248 Thus one perceptive federal district court noted that the factors to be considered under
Halkin's First Amendment standard, and the factors to be considered under federal Rule
26(c)'s "good cause" standard, were virtually "identical." The real difference, the Court
stated, "lies in the discretionary nature of the good cause standard. In determining whether
there is good cause to enter a Rule 26(c) order, a court may, but does not have to, weigh these
factors. Moreover, because a determination that good cause has been shown is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard, it is less likely that the appellate court would substi-
tute its judgment for that of the trial court even if, for example, it believed that more
deference should have been given to the other party's First Amendment interests. Under...
the [First Amendment standard], on the other hand, the court must find that definite criteria
have been satisfied before issuing a protective order, and failure to do so will result in a
reversal. To the extent that the discretion of the trial court is limited by [the First Amend-
ment], therefore, [it] provide[s] more protection for a litigant's First Amendment rights."
Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
249 See text at note 203 supra.
[1984
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the rule of independent review, or whether they should exercise
deference.
Appellate courts normally view the management of pretrial dis-
covery with considerable deference because trial courts are "in a far
better position than a court of appeals to supervise and control
discovery."2 ' When First Amendment considerations are present,
however, appellate courts ordinarily view trial court decisions as
raising issues of law. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, for example,
the Court applied the rule of independent review to a trial court
decision to issue a gag order, even though the order was issued by a
trial court that could be said to have had a more sensitive "feel for
the case" than any appellate court. The Court, moreover, exercised
independent review even though the First Amendment standard
controlling the issuance of the gag order was extremely vague and
involved the balancing of several factors.25' Indeed, as the Court
recently stressed, the rule of independent review is founded on the
necessity of creating a check on the exercise of weak discretion
arising from the generality of First Amendment standards:
252
Providing triers of fact with a general description of the type of
communication whose content is unworthy of protection has
not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category,
nor served to eliminate the danger that decisions by triers of fact
may inhibit the expression of protected ideas. The principle of
viewpoint neutrality that underlies the First Amendment itself
... also imposes a special responsibility on judges whenever it is
claimed that a particular communication is unprotected.
Thus whenever trial courts determine that speech is obscene, or
uttered with actual malice, or constitutes fighting words, such de-
terminations are reviewed by appellate courts as posing questions
of law, and this enables appellate courts to determine if these ques-
tions have been rightly or wrongly decided. 253 The Court of Ap-
peals in Halkin saw no reason to treat appellate review of restraining
orders any differently. This position is attractive in the light of the
extensive weak discretion characterizing decisions to issue re-
straining orders.
250 ACF Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1087 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
251 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
252 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1962 (1984).
2-3 Id. at 1961-63.
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The rule of independent review, however, is not invariably ap-
plied to the regulation of First Amendment rights. In Glines, for
example, the Court was willing to defer to military judgment con-
cerning the censorship of speech.2" 4 This deference cannot simply
be interpreted as the respect owing to the "expertise" of those
charged with the administration of government institutions. In Tin-
ker the Court refused to defer to the managerial authority of a state
school board. School officials are presumably as expert in the ad-
ministration of their institution as military officials are in the man-
agement of theirs. The difference must therefore be attributed to
the Court's assessment of the need for deference in the achievement
of legitimate institutional goals.255
The issue presented in Rhinehart is therefore whether applying the
rule of independent review to the issuance of restraining orders
would impair the capacity of trial courts to manage pretrial discov-
254 The Court reached a similar conclusion in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union,
433 U.S. 119 (1977), in which the Court upheld the authority of prison officials to suppress
First Amendment interests on the basis of "fears as to future disruptions" as long as such
fears were not "groundless." Id. at 127 n.5, 132-33. The Court concluded that such weak
discretion was necessary because of "the reasonable considerations of penal managemeot"
and the "self-evident" interest in "preserving order and authority in prisons." Id. at 132, 136.
In reviewing the suppression of First Amendment rights, a "wide-ranging deference" was "to
be accorded the decisions of prison administrators." Id. at 126. "The necessary and correct
result of our deference to the informed discretion of prison administrators permits them, and
not the courts, to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations in situa-
tions such as this." Id. at 128. In Connick v. Myers, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (1983), on the other hand,
the Court was ambivalent about whether it should defer to decisions to regulate the speech of
government employees. The Court noted that if employee expression were only marginally
related to matters of public concern, and if such expression "interfered with working rela-
tionships" in a situation where "close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public
responsibilities," "a wide degree of deference to employer's judgment is appropriate. Fur-
thermore, we do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent
that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest
before taking action. We caution that a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee's
speech more substantially involved matters of public concern." Id. at 1692-93.
255 In Tinker the Court's refusal to defer to the judgment of school officials did not necessar-
ily extend to all school decisions regulating speech. Underlying the Court's opinion was the
notion that school authority over speech had definite limitations. The Court stated, for
example, that "[i]f a regulation were adopted by school officials forbidding discussion of the
Vietnam conflict, or the expression by any student of opposition to it anywhere on school
property except as part of a prescribed classroom exercise, it would be obvious that the
regulation would violate the constitutional rights of students, at least if it could not be
justified by a showing that the students' activities would materially and substantially disrupt
the work and discipline of the school." 393 U.S. at 513. The Court appears to have viewed
the ban on black armbands as just such a regulation. That the Court refused to defer to it
does not imply that it would also refuse to defer to different regulations that were within
what the Court was _prepared to acknowledge as the legitimate authority of the school, as
for example those that occur in classroom settings.
[1984
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ery. This issue can be analyzed by precisely defining the objectives
served by the rule of independent review. Upon close inspection,
the Court is notably vague as to the nature of these purposes. It
says only that "[w]hen the standard governing the decision of a
particular case is provided by the Constitution, this Court's role in
marking out the limits of the standard through the process of case-
by-case adjudication is of special importance. ' 256 But of what im-
portance? There are two possibilities.
The importance of the rule of independent review might lie in
the fact that the "process of case-by-case adjudication," through the
classic alchemy of the common law, will eventuate in the enuncia-
tion of principles of law that are increasingly specific and strict,
thus gradually reducing the weak discretion implicit in general
First Amendment standards.2 57 But to the extent that the rule
serves this purpose, its function is ultimately to restrict the man-
agerial flexibility of the trial judge in the supervision of pretrial
discovery. If it is important to preserve such flexibility, then it
would be better to forestall this process of "case-by-case" adjudica-
tion by imposing a rule of deference.
On the other hand, the "special importance" of the rule of inde-
pendent review might refer not to its role in the development of
more specific standards, but rather to its role in ensuring that jus-
tice is done in the individual case. If the general nature of First
Amendment principles creates the danger that judgment to sup-
press speech might be exercised in a biased or improper manner,
the function of the rule of independent review might be to oversee
the exercise of judgment in each case so as to correct any such
errors or bias. Independent review would thus undo the effects of
improper suppression of speech.
If the rule of independent review is to serve this function, how-
ever, appellate review of restraining orders should be interlocutory
in nature. This is because damage to First Amendment interests
arises not merely from the outright suppression of speech, but also
216 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 104 S.Ct. at 1961.
z57 Thus Morris Cohen has observed: "Discretion, in general, represents more or less
instinctive evaluation or appreciation of the diverse elements that enter into a complex; and
such instinctive evaluation must precede conscious rulemaking. Rules are the limits that the
continued exercise of discretion establishes." COHEN, note 236 supra, at 264. See Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-21 (1975); CROSS, PRECEDENr IN ENGLISH LAW
214-16 (2d ed. 1968).
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from government action which temporarily delays expression. ss
An erroneous restraining order imposes additional damage for
every day that it remains in effect. For this reason the Court has
interpreted the First Amendment to require "immediate appellate
review" of judicial orders suppressing speech.2" 9 If the purpose of
the rule of independent review were to vindicate constitutional
rights, it too should be "immediate." Halkin clearly appreciated this
logic, for it held that restraining orders should be subject to im-
mediate appellate review through the extraordinary writ of man-
damus.2 60
To permit interlocutory appeals of restraining orders would
work a basic change in discovery practice. Under the law of most
jurisdictions, appeals are not allowed as a matter of right except
from final judgments.261 Judicial orders regulating discovery, in-
cluding restraining orders, are interlocutory and not appealable as a
matter of right until the ultimate disposition of a case.2 62 The rea-
sons for this policy were stated by the Court in Cobbledick v. United
States:2
63
Congress from the very beginning has, by forbidding piecemeal
disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single
controversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial administration.
Thereby is avoided the obstruction to just claims that would
come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of
separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation
may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment. To be
effective, judicial administration must not be leadenfooted. Its
momentum would be arrested by permitting separate reviews of
the component elements in a unified cause.
258 See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Carroll v. President and Com-
missioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. at 559.
259 National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977).
260 598 F.2d at 197-200.
261 STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 52-54 (1981); Glass v. Stahl
Specialty Co., 97 Wash. 2d 880, 883, 652 P.2d 948 (1982).
62 See Bushman v. New Holland Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 429, 518 P.2d
1078, 1079-80 (1974); Washington v. Superior Court, 193 P.2d 318, 319 (Wash. 1948);
HAYDOCK & HERR, DIsCovERY: THEORY, PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS 311-14 (1983). See,
Cutner, note 120 supra, at 947-48; Resnick, note 111 supra, at 411-14; International Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1963). Rbinebart was heard on appeal
pursuant to a Washington rule permitting discretionary review of interlocutory decisions.
See R.A.P. 2.3.
263 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 n.8
(1978); Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373-74 (1981).
HeinOnline -- 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 230 1984
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPEECH: DISCRETION AND RIGHTS
For these reasons, the ability of trial courts to manage pretrial
discovery would be substantially impaired if restraining orders
were to be routinely reviewable on interlocutory appeal.264 Every
time a trial court decided to condition discovery upon the issuance
of a restraining order, the pretrial conduct of the case could poten-
tially come to a halt during the months or perhaps years required
for prosecution of an "immediate" appeal.2 6 Trial courts would
think twice about issuing restraining orders, and their usefulness as
tools of pretrial management would be pro tanto diminished. The
inner logic of the rule of independent review, therefore, when ap-
plied in the context of restraining orders, would tend toward con-
clusions that substantially impair the management flexibility of trial
judges.
Despite this logic, it nevertheless can be contended that appellate
courts should offer noninterlocutory independent review on the
grounds that an ultimately correct disposition, however delayed,
will be of importance to particular litigants. There are two consid-
erations that weigh against this contention. The rule of indepen-
dent review presupposes that appellate courts can scrutinize facts
and law to determine the "correct" legal outcome. But each time an
appellate court announces such an outcome, it establishes a prece-
dent that will be binding on future trial court decisions. The ac-
cumulation of such precedents will in the end erode the weak
discretion necessary to govern pretrial discovery. Appellate court
deference, on the other hand, significantly diminishes both the
number and force of such precedents.
It is not clear, moreover, that the question whether a restraining
order should issue has any uniquely "correct" legal outcome. It is
possible, for example, for a trial court to issue a restraining order
264 The State of New York at present permits discovery orders to be appealed as a matter
of right, and the general consensus is that this practice "is a prime source of delay and
expense in litigation." Korn, Civil Jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals and Appellate
Divisions, 16 BUF. L. REV. 307, 330, 332-33 (1966-67). See 7 WEINSTEIN, KORN, & IL-
LER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 5701.03 (1983). During the debate surrounding the
enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (discretionary appeal), Charles E. Clark strongly "argued
that 'upper-court policing of trial court activity is not a sound appellate function and, in view
of its haphazard and freezing characteristics, can only be detrimental to effective court
administration.' " Fish, note 120 supra, at 109. Clark viewed the availability of interlocutory
appeals as creating the possibility of litigation strategies designed to erode an "adversary's
powers of resistance." Ibid.
26' A prime example is Halkin itself. The District of Columbia Circuit did not issue its
decision until almost two years after the trial court had signed the restraining order.
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because particular litigants are uncooperative and need to be kept
on a short leash,266 or because the bar practicing before it needs to
be taught an object lesson. 2 67 These are classic managerial consider-
ations, and they neither seem amenable to any uniquely correct
legal solution, nor do they seem susceptible to appellate court de-
termination. If such considerations are legitimate, it is not clear
whether independent review can perform any useful function.
These objections are not dispositive, but when they are raised in
a context in which the inner logic of independent review has been
truncated, they provide support for the Court's conclusion that
decisions to issue restraining orders constitutionally need only be
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
C. RESTRAINING ORDERS AND ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS
The abuse-of-discretion standard is a mansion with many rooms.
One such room, as Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard makes clear, is the
prescription that trial court decisions be made on the basis of "a
clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need
for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the
parties." This prescription imposes three distinct accountability
requirements on trial court decision making. Decisions must be
supported by a record; they must be based upon specific findings;
and there must be an articulation of the reasons for the decision.
Imposing these requirements serves two purposes: it improves the
quality of trial court decision making by forcing trial judges to
reach decisions in a careful and self-conscious manner, and it pro-
vides a sufficient record for meaningful appellate review.
Decisions to issue restraining orders plainly can interfere with
First Amendment rights. It would therefore appear to be constitu-
tionally important to impose the Bernard requirements on such de-
cisions if they would reduce the likelihood of improper restraining
orders. The Halkin decision appears to have imposed some of these
requirements, stating that trial courts must make "necessary find-
ings" with respect to each element of the appropriate First Amend-
ment standard.268 The Court in Rhinehart, on the other hand, ap-
266 See text at note 115 supra.
267 See text at notes 113, 117 supra.
268 598 F.2d at 1892.
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parently decided not to impose such requirements, stating in a
cryptic footnote that "heightened First Amendment scrutiny of
each request for a protective order" was inappropriate because it
"would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings." 269
The Court's point is obscure. It might be that the Bernard require-
ments are so burdensome that they unduly restrict the flexibility
necessary for pretrial management of a case. But why are these
requirements compatible with effective pretrial management in
Bernard, but not in Rhinehart? The Court's response is suggested by
its citation270 of Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., a
large antitrust case involving a restraining order covering "millions
of pages of documents produced in discovery."271 If the First
Amendment were to require the trial court in Zenith to make
findings, articulate reasons, and compile a record with respect to
each of these pages of discovery information, the burden would
clearly be overwhelming. That result calls to mind the blunt obser-
vation of a California district judge who refused to entertain a
motion to vacate a restraining order covering "massive quantities of
documents": "I might ... require that defendants now justify the
protective order as to each item which they believe should be pro-
tected. Some person would then be required to pass upon those
justifications. I do not propose to be that person. "272
The Court's concern for the special problems caused by large
cases seem appropriate, but not insurmountable. It would be sense-
less to impose accountability requirements in a self-defeating fash-
ion. In a case involving vast quantities of discovery information, it
may be perfectly appropriate for a trial court to structure its deci-
sion to issue a restraining order on the basis of generic categories of
documents, rather than on the basis of an item by item review.
This is the present practice of those courts which interpret the
"good cause" standard of Rule 26(c) to "require a particular and
specific demonstration of fact. ' 2 73 Even Halkin conceded that in an
appropriate case a trial court could issue "a blanket protective order
269 104 S.Ct. at 2209 n.23.
270 Ibid.
271 529 F. Supp. 866, 874 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
272 In re Coordinated Pretrial proceedings in W. Liquid Asphalt Cases, 18 F.R.Serv. 2d
1251, 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
273 See note 55 supra and the cases cited.
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covering all documents in a large-scale exchange of files without
prejudice to raising the merits of the protective order as applied to
particular documents at a later time." '274 If accountability require-
ments are interpreted to apply in a reasonable fashion-which is to
say, if they are interpreted not to impose an undue burden on trial
courts-there does not appear to be any good reason to view them
as inconsistent with effective trial court management of pretrial
discovery.
One can ask, however, whether these accountability require-
ments contribute so significantly to the quality of trial court deci-
sion making as to justify their being imposed as a constitutional
prerequisite. While there is no empirical evidence on this issue, it
does seem plain that imposing special requirements on decisions
affecting First Amendment interests invests these decisions with a
gravity and importance commensurate with the constitutional is-
sues at stake. Requiring decisions to issue restraining orders to meet
the Bernard accountability requirements will distinguish these deci-
sions from the "informal" atmosphere in which ordinary pretrial
administrative decisions are made.275 This is itself important, and it
is also ioteworthy that the Court has in other contexts required
trial court decisions affecting First Amendment rights to be accom-
panied by specific findings and an articulation of reasons. Adminis-
trative decisions to close criminal trials are, for example, subject to
such requirements.276
Even if these requirements only marginally improve the quality
of trial court decision making, it would seem especially important
to impose them on decisions to issue restraining orders, since such
decisions are reviewed only for abuse of discretion and hence are
unlikely to be reversed on appeal. Indeed, to the extent that the
abuse-of-discretion standard is weak, it would also seem particu-
larly appropriate that trial court decisions be accompanied by an
articulation of reasons and specific findings, so that appellate courts
will be more likely to detect erroneous interpretations of the con-
trolling legal standard. This was the logic of Bernard, and it should
274 598 F.2d at 196 n.47.
275 See Resnick, note 11 supra, at 407.
276 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S.Ct. 819, 824 (1984); Globe Newspa-
per Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608 n.20 (1982).
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have redoubled application in the constitutional context of re-
straining orders.
The facilitation of appellate court review can, however, have
adverse consequences. To the extent that accountability require-
ments further the creation of more and firmer appellate precedents,
they can also contribute to the erosion of weak trial court discre-
tion. Appellate courts have also been known to use accountability
requirements as a bootstrap to increase the rigor of appellate re-
view. These dynamics have in fact fueled much of American ad-
ministrative law.27 7 But accountability requirements are unlikely to
generate similar dynamics in the area of restraining orders. This is
because of the long and honored tradition of respecting trial court
discretion in the pretrial management of a case. The tradition is
stable because appellate courts trust trial judges in a way that they
have never trusted administrators. As a former judge of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit put it: "I ...begin with the
assumption that federal judges are men of high purpose who exer-
cise authority in the best interests of justice as they see it. If this
were not so, the wide range of discretion that was left to district
judges by the Rules would not have been left to them. ' 278 A similar
assumption underlies the Court's opinion in Rhinebart, and it pro-
vides good reason to believe that appellate courts will not use ac-
countability requirements to undermine necessary trial court dis-
cretion.
VI. CONCLUSION
This may suggest a conclusion that is, in the main, similar to
that intuitively attained by the Court in Rhinebart. That the Court
should have reached this conclusion is remarkable, for it flies in the
face of much received First Amendment wisdom. Restraining or-
ders are prior restraints, they are based upon the content of speech,
and they are issued at the discretion of a state official. The Court's
disregard of these facts demonstrates the strength instinctively at-
tributed to government interests in the internal management of
277 See, e.g., Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUPREME COURT
REVmW 177, 181-84, 209-12.
278 Waterman, An Appellate Judge's Approach When Reviewing District Court Sanctions Imposed
for the Purpose of Insuring Compliance with Pretrial Orders, 29 F.R.D. 420, 421 (1962).
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speech. The very power of these interests, however, requires that
they be carefully identified and analyzed, so that they may be
confined to appropriate circumstances. This is impossible, how-
ever, without the development of a more adequate appreciation of
the relationship of law to discretion. Discretion does not simply
begin "where the law ends," and for that reason the Court in
Rhinehart was deeply misguided in viewing trial court discretion to
manage speech as a constitutional carte blanche.
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